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When the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was being negotiated in the 1960s, states felt the urgency of the moment. In 1968, the US delegation to the First Committee proclaimed, for example, that the treaty “will do more than any treaty of our time to push back the fearful shadow of nuclear destruction.” Ambassador Goldberg said the NPT would “brighten the hopes of all nations, great and small, for a more peaceful world,” and said that the United States “is convinced that the substantial new obligations which we shall assume as a party to this treaty are far outweighed by the degree to which it will serve our national security and our national interests.” He spoke against insisting upon a perfect treaty, of which each member state had a different conception. Instead, Goldberg asked states to view the moment as one “when all of us, united by our common interest in peace and sheer human survival, must together summon the courage to take this long stride forward.” Quoting Shakespeare’s Julius Caeser, he said:
There is a tide in the affairs of men,Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;Omitted, all the voyage of their lifeIs bound in shallows and in miseries.
While the US delegation to the 2024 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) claimed repeatedly that it and its allies are fully compliant with the NPT—this treaty that in 1968 the US described as serving its national security—other members of the US government were simultaneously outlining their plans for nuclear weapon modernisation. The Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, Dr. Vipin Narang, said on 1 August that the US and its allies “must prepare for a world where constraints on nuclear weapons arsenals disappear entirely” and proclaimed that “the United States is prepared to do what is necessary to successfully compete … in this new nuclear age.”
How far we’ve fallen. The NPT constrained proliferation for decades. But the refusal of its five nuclear-armed members to eliminate their nuclear arsenals has led us to a point where the treaty’s survival is at stake—and the collective survival of humanity along with it.
Back in the PrepCom, on the final day states parties once again fought over the content and form of the Chair’s summary, which is meant to be an accounting of issues covered and position raised. Some delegations, such as Aotearoa New Zealand, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, and Mexico, argued that the revised version of the summary added undue emphasis to positions that work against nuclear disarmament and indicated the first version was a more accurate reflection of discussions. The nuclear-armed states, in contrast, seemed happy with the weight given to their positions in the revised text.
The meeting’s outcome was slightly improved from last year—the Chair’s summary was listed as a working paper in the PrepCom’s procedural report, though Russia insisted on a footnote clarifying that the summary is not a consensus-based document. Even still, with the stark divisions, rising tensions, and even open conflict among the nuclear-armed states, coupled with their renewed arms racing and collective defiance of international law, it certainly feels as if we are “bound in shallows and in miseries.”
Enhancing transparency
But all is never lost, not as long as activists, survivors, academics, and non-nuclear armed states stand against this tide. Admittedly, it’s a challenge in the NPT context. But as the side events, statements, working papers, writing, and conversations show, some of us are still working hard to prevent catastrophe and lead us on to fortune—i.e. to the abolition of nuclear weapons.
The discussions about NPT working methods during the second week of the PrepCom is one such space where those concerned are trying to bring the treaty out of the shallows. For example, some delegations and civil society groups are pushing for peer-reviewed reporting mechanisms and interactive dialogue, through which the nuclear-armed states would offer increased transparency about their arsenals and engage in discussion with the rest of the NPT’s membership about their reports. The idea is that this can help build trust among all NPT states parties, foster confidence between the nuclear-armed states, and help motivate nuclear disarmament. For example, Mexico said it supports “an exercise in critical diplomatic dialogue,” which it believes could “build trust, as well as encourage real debate and new dynamics in the way we relate to each other within the treaty.”
In addition, the hope of those pushing for increased transparency is that if everyone knows what the nuclear-armed states are doing and planning, there will be a better foundation for disarmament diplomacy and action. As Brazil noted, transparency is associated with accountability. It highlighted the working paper the New Agenda Coalition submitted to the previous review cycle, which included a detailed list of information that should be part of the standard reporting to measurably address transparency and accountability with the aim of achieving disarmament. Thailand likewise supported interactive discussions “to benchmark progress in disarmament efforts,” as did the Non-Aligned Movement.
In this context, Austria urged the establishment of “a meaningful independent review” of nuclear-armed states’ implementation of their disarmament obligations and commitments, either by peer-review or an independent outside body. Switzerland, Ireland, and Aotearoa New Zealand similarly said nuclear-armed states reports should be subject to “a systematic and structured peer review.” They suggested setting up a trial-run of an interactive dialogue with a volunteer state at next year’s NPT PrepCom, with the aim of finalising proposals to adopt at the 2026 Review Conference. This suggestion was echoed in a joint statement by 47 states issued on the final day of the PrepCom.
Nuclear-armed states’ reactions to enhanced transparency
Some of the nuclear-armed states indicated willingness to undertake new kinds of transparency exercises, to varying degrees; others opposed it outright.
France said it is “in favor of setting up an interactive, structured and in-depth dialogue on the national reports of nuclear and non-nuclear States during the cycle,” though it specified that this dialogue “would cover all three pillars of the NPT, as called for in Action 20 of the 2010 Action Plan.” The United States supported discussions on national reports, which it said should “involve all the nuclear weapons states and others that may choose to participate.” The United Kingdom indicated interest in allocating time in the NPT review process for interactive considration of reports. It said that nuclear-armed states that don’t publish details of their nuclear warhead stockpiles or delivery systems are undermining trust and confidence in the NPT.
Russia, in contrast, strongly objected to the suggestions of standardised reporting and interactive discussions about those reports. It argued that these suggestions are an attempt to imposing new obligations on nuclear-armed states and to “convert the NPT review process into a tool for oversight and coercion.”
China also registered its opposition to any mechanism that would increase transparency in the NPT review process. China argued that increasing transparency and reporting “will not lead to nuclear disarmament.” In the current international security environment, China asserted, it is “impossible for any country to be completely transparent.” It aruged that standardised reporting “will strengthen the strategic superiority of some countries to the detriment of the security interests of others.” Thus, China said it should be up to states parties how frequently they submit reports and that they should not have to adopt a universal template. Also, it argued, if there are going to be interactive discussions about nuclear-armed states’ reports than there should also be discussions on the reports of nuclear umbrella states parties.
During other plenary meetings at this PrepCom, China also suggested that transparency is tantamount to threat—i.e. that by revealing details about their arsenals, certain nuclear-armed states are flexing their muscles, signalling to the others that they have the ability to crush their opponents. On the other hand, which China did not mention, not being transparent means no one is sure about your capabilities or your intent, which is also an aggressive form of posturing.
The only answer to all of this gendered chest-puffing is to abolish nuclear weapons. The disarmament and demilitarisation process will require transparency. As Aotearoa New Zealand argued, “Enhanced transparency through a new peer review mechanism would help to improve the confidence of States Parties that nuclear weapon States are implementing their nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments.” Australia, noting that there is some “apprehension” among nuclear-armed states about what enhanced transparency would entail, argued that they should not see this antagonist but necessary to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, which “will require unprecedented levels of transparency.” Australia urged, “We have to get better at this, starting now.
Austria also acknowledged that there is “a tension between the requests for transparency that non-nuclear weapons states make and the transparency that different nuclear weapons states are currently ready to provide.” In this context, Austria raised the issue of responsibility. “Given the potentially catastrophic humanitarian consequences and existential risks of nuclear weapons, the states that are responsible for creating these risks also have a responsibility vis-à-vis the rest of the international community as regards transparency and accountability of these threats and risks. It is thus of crucial importance that we are making progress on this issue.”
Other suggestions to strengthen the NPT review process
Beyond the nuclear-armed state reporting, Austria also suggested restructuring the work of Main Committees and Subsidiary Bodies during the NPT Review Conference, including “kick-off presentations by experts to stimulate but also democratize our discussions,” and discussing proposals contained in working papers. Switzerland welcomed the recommendations in the Chair’s working paper of last year’s working group on further strengthening the review process on limiting the time devoted in NPT meetings to formal statements, with a view to having more time to address specific issues under the treaty and to have greater interactive debates.
Canada called for a discussion about bringing procedural matters to a vote when necessary. “Yes, this might set a precedent,” Canada acknowledged. “But what if that precedent were in the service of actual progress? The alternative is unthinkable: the precedent where a single dissenting state can override the majority’s will and potentially wipe the record clean of all proceedings.” Russia, unsurprisingly, strongly opposed this idea, proclaiming that “any non-consensus decisions will remain non-binding for the States that have not supported them.” It even warned that “abusing the voting procedure will most likely make a number of States doubt whether to continue participating in the review process.”
Putting such threats aside, consensus has been a problem in multiple disarmament forums (not to mention the UN Security Council) for years, allowing one or a small minority of states to prevent the development of international law or other commitments that would protect people and the planet from weapons and war. The UN’s more democratic fora, such as the UN General Assembly, where each member state has a vote, are the only remaining spaces where meaningful progress has been possible. Voting does not undermine the “security” of a minority—it makes sure that the minority’s perception of security does not override everyone else’s survival.
The 2023 report from the UN High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism argued that a frequent obstacle to progress in multilateral fora is “the overreliance on decisions by consensus, which has been interpreted in many settings to mean unanimity without objection.” It describes consensus as a “highly inefficient and unfair approach” that allows a small number of states to block multilateral action. As WILPF said in its statement to the working group on further strengthening the NPT review process last year, “Adoption of final documents that reflect the views and commitments of most states parties must not be able to be nullified by a handful of states. International law, and the actions to which governments commit to implement the law, must be upheld regardless of political circumstance or economic preference. Lives are at stake, as is the integrity of the entire multilateral system.”
Diverse participation is also crucial to ensure that everyone’s legitimate interests in surviving the nuclear age are represented in discussions about these weapons. Austria said that transparency requires inclusivity and called for improved civil society participation, including survivors of nuclear weapons, by allowing their participation throughout the deliberations; according civil society a number of speaking slots at every meeting to allow interaction throughout the deliberations to enliven discussions and promote new viewpoints; and adding speaking slots for representatives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation, the president of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons meetings of states parties, and other relevant treaties or organisations.
In this context, Austria also reiterated its call for “equal representation of all genders and gender perspectives and norms.” Australia also emphasised the importance of effective participation by all genders in the NPT review process and Ireland likewise noted that improving gender equality in participation in the NPT review process will enhance its effectiveness and outcomes. “Diverse teams and delegations are more innovative, take more sustainable decisions, and are more effective in resolving impasses.” As WILPF said in its statement to this PrepCom, people who have been historically marginalised in nuclear policymaking—including women, non-binary, gender non-conforming, and LGBTQ+ people, as well as people from affected communities, First Nations, and the Global South—“need to be centred now, as it’s very clear that the ‘traditional’ approaches have led us further and further away from a world free of nuclear weapons.” WILPF also argued:
Real diversity is not just about adding bodies to meeting rooms, but also about creating space for non-dominant ideas, imaginations, and perspectives to inspire concrete changes in policy and practice. Disarmament work needs people of diverse sexual orientations, gender identities, races, classes, abilities, backgrounds, and experiences. Only by including people who are impacted in different ways from nuclear weapons, and from the structures of power, violence, and militarism that sustain these weapons, can we have any hope of making real change.
On the importance of trying—because the alternative is massive nuclear violence
Making procedural changes to the working methods of NPT meetings is of course insufficient to meet the dangers of this moment. Austria noted, “The challenges the NPT is facing are not really related to our working methods. They would be adequate if all states parties had sufficient political will to make progress on the implementation of the treaty. The real problems are of course political and not procedural.” However, there are things that NPT states parties could do to improve matters, and every party to this treaty has a responsibility to do what it can. After all, as Brazil said, “like sharks and romances, international regimes need to keep moving forward, otherwise they perish.”
Thanks to Zia Mian for the inspiration of looking to Goldberg and Narang’s comments.
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