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The Second Bullet

Transgenerational Impacts of the Trauma of Conflict within a South African and World Context

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And death is no longer a chance event. To be sure, it still seems a matter of chance whether a bullet hits this man or that, *but a second bullet may well hit the survivor,* and the accumulation of death puts an end to the impression of chance.

<div align="right">SIGMUND FREUD (1915, pp. 291–292)</div>

The only way to stop feeling so bad is a new kill.

<div align="right">—SOUTH AFRICAN PERPETRATORS AND THEIR CHILDREN</div>

Few people have had access to Southern Africa's most feared perpetrators, members of the notorious killing team called Koevoet, an "antiguerrilla" group of the South African army, which fought in Namibia. Members wore T-shirts inscribed "Murder is our business: And business is good!" "Sometimes we killed them quickly, sometimes we killed them slowly. . . . We felt fantastic. We drank a beer and said a short prayer: 'Thank you, Lord.' " The group killed large numbers of black guerrillas representing the Namibian forces that now govern that country. These former killers speak of the satisfaction it gave them, commenting, "After a day, you must have another *kill,* to feel the adrenaline in your blood."

Braam (1994), with the assistance of myself and others, conducted one of the very few studies of these perpetrators. They describe routine atrocities, which give a thrill they liken to that of drugs: "You get addicted to it, you can't do without it." They speak nostalgically of the kick of describing the latest kill at the bar with your mates, and of knowing they had survived he episode. After each kill, they talk of standing in silent prayer: "Thank you, Lord, for taking this life." They talk of experiencing withdrawal symptoms when they inadvertently went

a week without a "kill." Between deaths, they describe feeling a depression, and "the only way to stop feeling so bad is a new kill. But as that becomes more normal, more usual, you need still more, it must be more gruesome" (e.g., Braam, 1994, p. 42). "Maybe I became mad. . . . I have photos in which I drag the brains out of someone's head. I would so much like you to see that. You must see the photos." No one teaches them to stop killing. They describe classic symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorders (PTSD). Some burned their trophies and photographs; some still treasure them. They watch war—the Gulf War, Bosnia—endlessly on television, watching CNN all night during the active phases of such warfare, though it brings back the nightmares.

One showed his albums of color pictures: holidays, a wedding—and kills. His 5-year-old son was watching and obviously thoroughly familiar with them as he showed the pictures, six per page, page after page, of bodies with huge gaping wounds. He described with expert relish which weapons caused which wounds. Then another album, and another. Bodies split open, spilling their contents. "I sometimes wonder if there's something wrong in my head." The boy is undisturbed: "Show my favourite video, Papa!" This video shows the orgiastic final days of killing: prisoners walk miserably between Koevoet soldiers. "Kaffirs!" exclaims the boy. "Terrorists," corrects the father. Now, the prisoners are on the ground, twitching, bleeding, dead. Hundreds of bodies, now being pulled together and posed in weird postures. When the video is completed, he sends the boy to bed, and continues talking about his experiences.

In 1989, toward the end of the 23-year-war, there was a United Nations-overseen ceasefire. When young Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) soldiers (members of the liberation forces) crossed into the territory to give themselves up to UNTAG (United Nations) forces, Koevoet soldiers killed over 300, mostly by close-quarter shots in the head. The bodies were dumped into massed graves. Soon afterward, the group was officially disbanded, and millions of rands were spent on "golden handshakes" (tax-free retirement gratuities) to the 613 members. They had earlier kept a scoreboard of "kills," and were paid Kopgeld (literally, head-cash) bonuses per body, dead or alive: R 1,000 for a SWAPO fighter, R 500 for his gun, and so on: killing on commission. It was easier to kill and bring back the body for the bonus than to try to bring back a live "Terr." The bodies would be tied to the vehicle bumper or to the spare wheel, like hunters returning with deer, except that they had been hunting humans. But live captives were also valued by their "security force" bosses. According to one source, these were used to test torture and interrogation techniques, as well as to get information. The prisoners, kept in solitary confinement, were formally paid R 20 per month, so that they could be accounted for as in the service of the South African forces, and thus not be available for Red Cross access. "Koevoet took no prisoners of war: only new recruits," says one.

Suicide is quite common in Koevoet veterans. The survivors complain of hearing of the suicide of old comrades: "To Hell with this world." They have been candid, and feel relieved to speak of things they have done, what they describe as things you can't talk of, even with your own wife. They feel there is no place for them in the "new South Africa," having seen their former enemies form the governments of Namibia and South Africa, and they resent the lack of recognition and gratitude for their deeds. "No one understands us," they complain. More recently, we have been consulted by members of the radical black "Self-Defense Units" (see below), wholly on the other side of the political spectrum in Koevoet. They have no photo albums but describe the same symptoms, and complain in the same way, of a high suicide rate.

INTRODUCTION

Myth and legend have a reliable record of revealing insights that scientists have taken centuries to rediscover laboriously. In Africa, traditional beliefs have always emphasized the continuing and active relevance of the ancestors in current life affairs and the lasting contamination caused by violence and trauma. Similarly, as Goodwin (1993) and especially Robbins (1993) have shown, gross intergenerational cycles of violence were a consistent and basic feature of the ancient Greek legends. Robbins impressively retells the case of Oedipus, for example, as "part of a pattern of continuing multigenerational familial dysfunction in a violent lineage noted for breaching norms, biological as well as societal" A long litany of matricide, parricide, filicide, incest, rape, bestiality, war, and assassination, with children abused, abandoned, and killed, is a central thread in these complex tales of human and social misery. We vary in what we learned from myths such as the story of Oedipus. Freud and others emphasized the enduring intrapersonal and intergenerational reverberations of such trauma; more recently, we have accepted the long-lasting interpersonal and multigenerational effects among family members. Albeck (1994), himself a second-generation survivor, who has provided a usefully critical review of the concept of intergenerational consequences of trauma and agrees with this point of view, says, "Until very recently, psychological explanations for trauma's effects have tended to focus on intrapsychic factors at the expense of the interactive social, political, and historical aspects" (p. 109).

This understanding of the individual principally within the full context of family, community, and nation, is basic to our African worldview. Figley (1995) admits that much of the traumatology literature "is dominated by Western-oriented conceptions" and focused "almost exclusively on individual functioning" But he then enlarges this viewpoint only so far as to include individual families, calling this "systemic PTSD." However, this is a similarly Western limitation, which still ignores the larger systems of community and nation, within which such traumatic reactions are always contextually embedded. Similarly, Westermeyer (1995), though discussing cross-cultural aspects of trauma care, fails to grasp the issues from anything but a profoundly Western and Eurocentric viewpoint.

In this chapter, I wish not only to explore those aspects of the traumatic experiences of South Africa, but also to emphasize the remaining, and even more widely ignored, dimension (so clearly represented in so many early myths): the abiding effects of unresolved conflict on communities and nations. The continuing sociopolitical fallout of individual and larger social forms of violence and trauma, generating lasting multigenerational cycles of trauma, are a significant historical force deserving study by clinical and psychological experts, as well as historical and political commentators. I explore the fact that there are clear societal changes in the wake of major traumatic historical events that are highly analogous to the individual symptoms of posttraumatic disorders. Our growing understanding of PTSD and trauma reactions can advance our understanding of history, and an understanding of history can assist us in comprehending individual and community responses to trauma.

THE TRAUMA OF CHANGE

Since 1987, researchers have concentrated greatly on PTSD, which has proved such a fruitful concept, but have too often overlooked the fact that there are a variety of other posttraumatic syndromes. There is what has been called "complex PTSD" (Herman, 1992), and "partial PTSD" [in patients who persistently suffer from severe PTSD symptoms without fully meeting

the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) at one point in time]. Even more neglected, there are posttraumatic dissociation disorders, and posttraumatic somatization disorders, identity problems, repetition compulsions, reexposure problems, and others. For years, I have emphasized (e.g., Simpson, 1993c) that there are broader and consistent patterns of communal response to trauma, in-group and community posttraumatic pathologies, which often contribute significantly to continuing social unrest and violence.

Just as Danieli (1984) emphasized countertransference reactions among therapists in individual psychotherapy with Holocaust survivors, so I have described (Simpson 1993c, and elsewhere) similar patterns of denial in social and professional responses to the facts and victims of repression. Disguised by a pretense of neutrality, most world health workers and general citizens ignore widespread abuses of human rights, fail to take even those actions readily open to them that would discourage such abuses, and maintain friendly and profitable relationships with perpetrators and collaborators while avoiding victims. In the face of evil events, doing nothing, or ignoring the facts, is not being neutral: It is giving essential support to the perpetrators. There are not two sides to every issue. No one feels bound to be neutral toward cancer or to balance evenly the needs of the patient and the cancer, or to be neutral toward child abuse, or earthquakes: Why should repression and torture be more privileged? Even the most rabid ecofanatics, who have argued that the preservation of every species (however obscure) is a higher priority than regular human needs, have not mounted a "Save the Smallpox" campaign.

Innovation and transition are stressful, even when voluntary, planned, desired, and occurring in safe settings. How much more is the pathological impact when they are involuntary, unplanned, ambivalently welcomed, and in situations of long-lasting instability. The prospect (Simpson, 1993c) of giving up the relative predictability of a familiar repression for the uncertainty of an unpredictable future, which may certainly be different but may not necessarily be better, is daunting. Getting what you have struggled and suffered for, for decades, and discovering that it is not as sweet and satisfying as you dreamed it would be, magnifies the effect.

Marris (1974), in an often overlooked book, described "anxieties of change" in situations that are individually or communally traumatic. Relevant to the situations in South Africa and in former Yugoslavia, he discussed tribalism as a response of those who lose their bearings in a heterogenously changing society. They cling to natural or invented "national" group identities, which they relate to a past that is only partly realistic (but usually irrelevant to current needs) and largely mythological. One sees the invention of "instant traditions": new practices, designed to resemble ancient historic forms and claimed as evidence of archaic status. Retreating within such tribal boundaries enables them to project their ambivalence, fears, and internal conflicts on the rest of society at large and especially upon close neighbors. They become organized around an ideology of inevitable conflict in which they see themselves as brave and innocent martyrs, valiantly withstanding an onslaught from barbarian hordes external to themselves and unable to comprehend the mystic centrality of their ethnic purity. At the social level, this variation of the typical process of "blaming the victim" is even more malignant. Those people who are the prime and continuing cause of conflict and its exacerbation, often the actual perpetrators of human rights abuses, are able to portray themselves as victims of those they are in fact victimizing.

SOCIAL RESPONSES TO CONFLICT AND WAR

There is a German term *vergangenheitsbewältigung,* referring to the attempt to come to terms with the past, a necessary exercise for nations and communities, as well as individuals. In 1994–1995, the popular literature was full of articles about the strong and persistent mem-

ories, including vivid negative emotions, evoked by anniversaries of World War II. It seemed widely agreed, as Jackson (1994a) wrote, that "50 years is not long enough to dissipate the bitterness of Allied soldiers who suffered" (p. 37). There were demonstrations and protests, and demands for apologies and other acts demonstrating repentance and regret by representatives of the perpetrators of past trauma. This provided a poignant backdrop to the very opposite situation in South Africa, where the millions of victims of a much longer, as well as more recent, period of severe suffering were being lectured by their new rulers to forget promptly and to stop referring to their pain. In the dubious name of "national reconciliation" (no one has yet explained how you can achieve reconciliation of groups that have never before been conciliated), they were told to "forgive and forget." No one in power, neither the representatives of the old regime still sharing government, nor the new figures who were once leaders of the liberation movement, showed any sign of recognizing the impossibility of commanding such complex emotional responses or of requiring such intricate sociocultural processes.

Similarly, while there was also broadly expressed consensus that, as Jackson (1994b) wrote, applying to the Balkan tragedy the lessons of World War II, the war-crimes trials held in Germany and Japan after World War II set the standards for such proceedings, establishing the principle that leaders may be held responsible for atrocities committed during the conflict. In contrast, in South Africa, politicians of all parties, with striking and unusual unanimity, announced that "of course" nothing resembling the Nuremberg Trials was conceivable in the South African situation. Recent studies of the lasting effects of national as well as individual guilt (e.g., Buruma, 1995; Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993) are highly relevant to the South African situation. Rarely has such a widespread and deliberate failure to learn from history been so obvious. Some may fondly imagine that this was a noble response, springing entirely from virtuous motives. This would have been easier to believe if those who waxed so eloquent about "forgiveness" had anything they personally needed to forgive, and if none of the politicians who reached this rogues' accord were in any way at risk of appearing before such Tribunals. Perhaps it was more cynical realism: Who, after all, were or will be tried or punished for the atrocities in Cambodia, El Salvador, Lebanon, Tibet, Somalia, and the many other killing fields of this century? Perhaps a Nuremberg resolution requires that the victims are on the side that wins a decisive ultimate victory, a rare situation.

CULTURAL ASPECTS OF RESPONSES TO TRAUMA IN AN AFRICAN SETTING

There are broad similarities in relevant cultural beliefs about how the dead influence the living, surely the primal instance of transgenerational impacts of trauma. The comparative anthropological studies of Fraser (e.g., 1933/1934/1936/1937) illustrate this. There has been widespread belief that those who have died traumatically can and do return to wreak vengeance on those living who were responsible, and mutilation of the dead to seek to prevent knowledge that this has been a common practice (see, e.g., Fraser 1934, Vol. 2, pp. 75–96, citing examples in Europe). There is a curious echo of the mutilations reported to have occurred in Vietnam, in the ancient Greek practice (Fraser, Volume 2, 1934, p. 81) whereby murderers would cut off the ears and noses of their victims to weaken the ghost's potential for returning, bent on vengeance. Apart from the general fear of the dead, which is Fraser's main theme, there are numerous examples of the belief that the traumatically killed are more likely to haunt and damage the survivors. This is best exemplified in Chapter 3 of Fraser's third volume (1936, pp. 103–303). He concluded that there are almost always consistent and major distinctions in

relation to the cause of death. The most dangerous ghosts are widely recognized to be those of those slain, those who have died a premature and violent death, or those who have been murdered, or suicides, or those who died in battle or were killed by wild animals.

In Zulu thought, for example, Death is associated with pollution (*umnyama*), which diminishes one's resistance to disease and creates a situation predisposing to misfortune (*amashwa*) (see Ngubane, 1977). In a manner reminiscent of the A criterion in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals* DSM-III and DSM-III-R, these traditional beliefs specify that death from an accident or from unusual misfortune, war, accident, or crime leads to a special and more severe type of *umnyama* called *umkhoka*. There is, of course, also a central belief that the ancestors continue to be powerful influences on their descendants. They can bring health and good luck when pleased, and if displeased, the withdrawal of their protection leaves their descendants vulnerable to disease and misfortune. Thus, it is obvious that transgenerational effects of trauma are recognized in the traditional African way of thinking.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR TRAUMA AND ITS IMPACT AS EXEMPLIFIED IN SOUTH AFRICA

Evolving strategies conflict have led to varying patterns of trauma, so far largely ignored by most specialists in this field. World War I, and especially World War II, explicitly blurred the distinction, often previously kept clear, between soldier and civilian. It has since almost wholly disappeared. Civilians became absolutely explicit targets, whether in the bureaucratically vicious concentration camps or the indiscriminate bombing of large cities. More like the earlier instances of siege, the degree of suffering and privation inflicted was deliberately sought as a means to place pressure on the enemy politicians and their military complex.

In the recent South African conflict, while the regime victimized the population at large, the African National Congress (ANC) and liberation movement took this trend still further, using large masses of the civilian population as an instrument of conflict. This included the organization of large marches and mass stay-aways from work, which are traditionally nonviolent means of protest *when used in democratic and nonrepressive societies,* but which otherwise usually lead to violent confrontation. To some extent, this encompasses the tactic expressed in the student confrontations in Europe and American in the 1960s, that by provoking acts of violence against oneself, one can force a regime to reveal its true nature, converting covert repression into explicit and well-publicized violent acts. One convincing view of the basic nature of terrorism is the use of violence by one party against another (preferably symbolically significant and innocent) in order to produce an impact on a third party. This tactic is related to the hunger strikes used earlier by the Irish Republican Army in Britain and later in South Africa as a special form of terrorism in which the person causing or inciting the violence and the person receiving and suffering its direct effects is conflated into the same individual. The intention is still to disturb and affect the behavior of an audience of others not party to the direct conflict. But such tactics are effective only against a government with scruples, or at least capable of shame, or more realistically, one that is acting covertly at variance with its public self-image and declared ideals, and is thus open to embarrassment. Gandhi could be effective against the British in India by revealing to them that they were acting in ways their ideals would declare them incapable of doing. But Gandhi was ineffective against the Boers in South Africa, because it never occurred to them that they should not be beastly to non-Boers.

More damaging in its lasting effects was the ANC policy of rendering large areas "ungovernable" by encouraging civil unrest and damage to social and community structures and

organization. Such methods were perhaps inevitable results of the creativity of a resistance movement faced with a world that provided much verbal support but little real logistical support for conventional warfare. But the risk, demonstrated in South Africa, is that large areas become not merely ungovernable by the unpopular regime but by all forms of governance. This has had a severe, lasting, and damaging impact on South African society, which seems likely to last for many generations.

Hansson and van Zyl Smit (1990), among others, have reviewed relevant aspects of the old regime's evolving attempts to destroy the opposition to apartheid. Earlier, in the P. W. Botha presidency, there was the "total strategy," conceived as a response to the "total onslaught" of an international communist conspiracy (all opposition to apartheid was automatically seen as communist) against capitalism (epitomized, bizarrely, by the twisted socialism of South African racism). Any and all means were seen as justifiable in responding to such a wholly evil offensive. It was argued that intense, widespread, and violent oppression was essential to produce "law and order" as a prerequisite to any reform. This view prescribed more of the brutal force, which had caused the unrest in the first place, as necessary to end it, while the policies that engendered it would be changed only after the violence they were causing had ended. Not surprisingly, this approach caused massive misery and steady escalation of trauma. As ex-President de Klerk was once quoted as saying, in using such counterinsurgency methods, "it may be that the enemy is the majority of the population" (de Klerk, 1989, in Hansson & van Zyl Smit, 1990).

Later, around mid-1986, there was increased use of "low-intensity conflict or low-intensity warfare," a post-Vietnam counterinsurgency stratagem (see, e.g., Hippler, 1987). Among its tenets were strenuous efforts to separate guerrilla forces from the general population, such as by disinformation (using the huge resources of the State) and by staging atrocities that could be blamed on the guerrillas, a tactic used by the regime at least up to the April 1994 first elections, in the opinion of many experts. The traumatogenic potential of such methods has been little studied. Other methods include population resettlement (traumatic in itself and reducing access to the normally strong community support mechanisms) and a more deliberate and focused rather than indiscriminate use of violence directed at civilians. By this means, a State causes massive damage to its own citizens, but covertly, disguising the author of the trauma. It is, as Hippler wrote, a fight without appearing to fight. Military objectives are sought by social manipulation, while overtly courting social popularity. There are superficial reforms, with much attention given to providing and publicizing the simulation of modification and a veneer of program, while ensuring as little substantial reform as possible. There is careful targeting of activists and of political and community leadership, further damaging the community and its ability to heal itself. The State acted to achieve its aims, but so far as possible by surrogates, such as vigilante groups like the Witdoeke, (Theological Exchange Program, 1987). The WHAM policy (Winning the Hearts and Minds) actually damaged both. Like a deliberate induction of DESNOS or complex PTSD, there is premeditated promotion of distrust and disillusionment.

Overt and covert violence became official and formal state policy from 1976 on, while among the resistance movements, violent reaction was seen as legitimate and even popular. In a sort of privatization of conflict, they declared a "people's war." After the regime had made all civilians targets of discrimination, and of indirect and direct violence, the resistance declared all civilians to be combatants. Tactics, successful to a degree in the short term, have proved to have long-lasting damaging effects showing a significant variety of the transmission of trauma via enduring harm to social structures. A government that refuses to allow any nonviolent means of achieving change (as the South African government did so assiduously) creates a

crucible of violence. Violence may, in such a situation, become the only effective means of promoting desirable reforms. Even if inefficient, it can at least convincingly simulate change. A government that forbids other means of resolving conflict will inevitably promote violence. Criminalizing politics politicizes crime.

THE ROLE OF CHILDREN IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

Youth played a leading part in the struggle for democracy from early times. The ANC Youth League was founded in the late forties out of the feeling that the established leadership of the time was not vigorous enough in opposing the regime. The youth leaders prominent at that time included Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, now elder statesmen, themselves facing a restless and unsatisfied youth. Once again, in the late 1960s, new groups arose, such as the Black Consciousness movement of Steve Biko and others dissatisfied with the failure of older activists to achieve meaningful changes. Saths Cooper (1994) has suggested a progressive de-velopment: the "young Turks" of South African politics in the 1940s were in their thirties; Biko and his peers were in their early twenties. In the 1970s and 1980s, leaders in community ac-tivism were in their teens, and in early teenage years at that. Successive older generations were seen as having compromised the cause. The major traumatic events that shaped the course of political developments (such as the Sharpeville massacre of March 21, 1960, and the Soweto uprising of June 16, 1976) were youth-led acts of resistance, leading to the deaths and suffer-ing of youth in government counterresistance. The successive waves of political activists mov-ing into exile became younger, leaving still younger groups of activists, with few or no significant older leaders. As the society of the oppressed majority produced successive crops of leadership, these were regularly depleted by voluntary or involuntary exile, or by govern-ment-orchestrated deaths and imprisonments, driving the locus of leadership younger and younger. Youth, precisely became of its lack of experience of previous attempts and of failure, is more easily able to adopt a single-minded and simplistic optimism and zealousness, un-hampered by awareness of the complexities of the situation.

In any society, old activists are rare. The longer the succession of life experiences in which the individual has been unable to influence the course of events, the less likely it is that anyone will seriously question the inevitability of the status quo. In the case of apartheid, an entire so-cial structure was designed with the active participation of social and behavioral scientists (Breyten Breytenback called them "spychologists") to magnify that effect and to induce a sub-stantial degree of learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975) on its citizens. Only by such means, by convincing the majority that resistance cannot succeed, can any minority regime maintain power. Only the young, not yet fully subdued by this, retained the capacity to act and to resist.

Facing a common and rather undiscriminating menace, enhanced peer socialization and the induction of a "struggle mentality," which has proved hard to give up, apartheid deliberately (see, e.g., Simpson, 1995) provided black youth with poor education designed to maintain a menial status. In response, the youth boycotted such "education," inducing large-scale disruption of fam-ily structures. Cooper (1994) reports finding that 6 out of 10 youths involved in the struggle could not identify with one parent, usually male, because he was not around or they did not know who he was. In some areas, 75% were born in single-parent homes. Completely contrary to the traditional black society, their socialization came from their peers, not their unavailable elders.

Black children were often in the forefront of the organized resistance to the regime. This may have mitigated, to some extent, the damage caused to them, by promoting self-esteem,

pride, dignity, and self-respect, and reducing the sense of powerlessness. Indeed, at times, it promoted an unrealistic and exhilarating sense of power. In practice, it was difficult to render a community ungoverned and ungovernable. It is far more difficult to regain civic governance and social cohesion. In the same way, any idiot with a hammer can stop a clock: Very few can mend one, and very different tools are needed. These youth often led their elders. White South African children often grew up with a black "nanny": a woman, often forced to neglect her own children in order to provide prolonged and intimate care of "the young master." There have been no adequate studies of the impact of the long-term effects of such child-rearing practices. White children almost totally ignored participation in the struggle, concentrating instead on enjoying and entrenching their unearned privileges. There were white participants in the struggle, but only on a very small scale, and usually aged from the twenties up. Ironically, one of the most politicizing and radicalizing forces for white youth was the enforcement of compulsory military conscription. Many of the richer youths avoided the draft, usually by emigrating, under rather comfortable circumstances, then enjoying the claim of having opposed a system they had in truth done nothing whatever to oppose other than merely to escape its tedious inconveniences. Poorer and lower class white youths did not have this option. While the Army used conscription very deliberately as a means of political indoctrination, the gradually increasing racial integration of the army and its facilities (born of necessity, and against the wishes of the ideology) brought white and black youths together, sharing risks and scarce comforts, and making the discovery (monumentally huge for some of them) of how much they had in common, and how little they differed. Apartheid had successfully hidden this fundamental fact from them and from their elders.

Black youth became a specific target of State terrorism, trying to destroy their resistance. Youths took on the task of protecting their communities, and many were killed or exiled. Evidence is only now becoming available that proves beyond reasonable doubt the reality of the previous allegations of so-called "Third Force" terrorism that became rampant as the nation moved toward a negotiated settlement. The State "security" forces sponsored, trained, and armed black vigilantes to conduct acts of extreme violence and terrorism that could then be blamed on the liberation forces. To those denied any role whatever in positive social ascendancy, the only source of power was violence. Thus, repressive regimes create the resistance they claim to be responding to. They became desensitized to violence. It was still feared but no longer really shocking, thus lowering the threshold to ordinary social and domestic violence.

Despite the world's applause, the bulk of the people were in fact even more marginalized by the negotiations, which were strictly limited to the politicians, who met their own needs rather than those of the people and never consulted those most affected by their decisions. Youth was especially ignored. As one young Soweto activist complained, "We were the lions you asked to roar: now the only ones who listen to us are the drug dealers." As Cooper (1994) comments, "Their usefulness expended, they are being infantilized by the new compact between erstwhile oppressor and erstwhile oppressed." Not just superfluous, they were seen to threaten the cosy, mutual back-scratching of the politicians who were demonstrating the essential identity of the species, offering the chronically dispossessed further alienation, not affirmation.

CHILDREN AS AGGRESSORS

Recent African experience has also revealed the increasing role played by child soldiers. Children were recruited or conscripted into partisan armies as young "comrades" seeking confrontation. Showing aggressive responses to trauma or its threat can be adaptive for some

individuals, though damaging for the community. Once, random violent acts that disrupted society were praised by some as "crippling apartheid" but were later criticized as lawless, confusing their authors. "Self-defense units," set up to defend communities from State and factional violence, themselves grew to become heavily armed, powerful, and feared. Never mind *quis custodiet custodies:* Who defends us from our defenders? Who will liberate us from our liberators? To the ill-educated or uneducated, unemployed or never employed, in bleak, arid, and boring environments, crime and violence can become the main means of entertainment and stimulation, the sole source of any sense of self-worth, the *raison d'etre* for the only groups within which many individuals can feel a sense of belonging and mutual respect. As adults were seen as unable to protect the young, they were no longer seen as valid authorities or sources of norms of conduct.

Prior exposure to trauma can sensitize or "steel" the individual to later incidents. Ideology explained and led to an expectation of state violence. Intracommunity violence was less explicable, less comprehensible, and often more traumatizing. The longer the duration of exposure to violence, the less the protective effect of mediating factors such as available caretakers. The effects of apartheid, other than direct trauma, were such as to be adjuvant factors, enhancing the pathogenicity of traumatic events. There were no safe places: family violence, dangerous streets and schools, rebounding trauma. We have also found that children are more likely to show symptoms of stress disorders when their caregivers have PTSD or other significant stress symptoms themselves. Similarly, Famularo *et al.* (1994), in their study of mothers and children following earlier occurrence of severe maltreatment of the child, found a relationship between the mothers' responses and those of the children, with PTSD "significantly overrepresented in the children of mothers diagnosed with PTSD"

In 1994, a hasty, unrepresentative, and self-appointed Commission of Inquiry (Duncan & Rock, 1994) studied other people's work in South Africa on the effects of political and social violence on children, drawing heavily on the present author's work (Simpson, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c, 1993d, 1993e). Studies have suggested that the more often children encounter violence, the more likely they may be later to perpetrate violence (Aysen & Nieuwoudt, 1992; Dawes & Tredoux, 1990; Hirschowitz, Milner, & Everatt, 1992; Klassen, 1990; Malepa, 1990). Straker, Moosa, Becker, and Nkwale (1992) emphasized the relatively recently recognized issue of children as aggressors involved in hideous acts of cruelty (like "necklacing," in which the victims, hands tied, have a car tire filled with petrol placed around their neck, which is then set on fire) and other murders of perceived political opponents.

THE INFANTILIZING OF BLACK ADULTS

Apartheid had the concept of *baasskap:* of boss-ness, or master-ness, a worldview that saw whites as an *ubermensch* and blacks as children needing the paternalistic and firm guidance of the white "boss." The cross-culturally dominant image of adult blacks as children persisted. To this day, adult black men and women are often called "boys" or "girls": "Just give it to the Boy, and ask the Girl to bring in the tea!" At best, they might be called by their first name, or, more insultingly, by a generic first name: "Jim", or "Mary", irrespective of their true name. Even the autonomous political act of resistance to tyranny was persistently and insistently misrepresented by the regime as entirely due to the actions of outsiders: "agitators" or "intimidators"—as if any sensible person subjected to the treatment prescribed by apartheid would fail to be agitated by it, without someone else fomenting ill-feeling. Blackness was equated with the rampaging and lurking id, controlled only by the presence of a white superego.

These old practices meant that today's young blacks grew up in a world where their parents were treated as children. There was a clear inversion of traditional leadership structures, with the young involved actively in liberation political action and their parents often discouraging this as dangerous. Cycles of loss and trauma were apparent. As the freedom to hold public gatherings was severely curtailed as politically perilous, funerals, especially of those who were seen as victims of government action, became the focus of community solidarity and mobilization, and thus were politicized. They were then, in their turn, controlled by the State. Criminalizing ordinary political activity led to a concomitant politicization of ordinary criminality. Now, we see criminals who claim that they rob banks—not, as the famous crook once said, because that's where the money is—but because they were representatives of the underprivileged nonparticipants in capitalism, or some such political guff. They were not stealing bankrolls, they were "redistributing wealth." The fact that it was being redistributed rather exclusively to themselves, and with even less benefit to the community at large than before, largely escaped attention. The regime had been in so many aspects a kleptocracy. Theft, graft, and corruption have become endemic in all sectors of the community and especially in the "public service." Vast amounts of scarce funds were wasted and stolen, as new administration officials now admit. A veteran of the liberation movements, Dr. Siphiwe Stamper, is quoted, referring to an honored old liberation slogan that meant "The struggle continues", as now saying, "A *luta continua* was given a new meaning here . . . "the looting continues" (van der Linde, 1995). As Bulhan (1985) remarked, "Violence breeds more violence . . . and a community of victims, unaware of its history and unable to control its destiny, engages in much autodestructive behavior" (p. 174).

THE EFFECTS OF CHILD TRAUMA ON PARENTS

In the existing world literature, the main concern seems to have been with the effects of traumatized parents on their children. But also important is the effect of traumatized children on the parents and the interactions when both are traumatized, as well as the impact of adult trauma on those who were traumatized, similarly or differently, as children. Elsewhere (Simpson, 1993b), I have reviewed in much greater detail the effects of political violence and repression on children and adolescents, and the effects of torture and coercive interrogation (Simpson, 1993a, 1996). In the latter study, I emphasized the frequency with which we have seen in South Africa the reverse of the effects often described in regard to Holocaust survivors. In our setting, "the younger generation has been, preponderantly, the victims, and it is the older, parental generation that shows the secondary effects. Not infrequently, the effect of the martyrdom or victimization of the child has been a radicalization of the parents (often very conservative people originally) and a move toward the parents' sharing their child's ideals and joining the struggle" (p. 681).

THE EFFECT OF PARENTAL TRAUMA ON CHILDREN

Most of the studies one sees in the literature on multigenerational effects of the Holocaust seem to be of parents who experienced the Holocaust and children born after it, rather than of instances where both parents and children shared the experience of the Holocaust. Parents are described as absorbed in their own pain, leaving the children to "separate development"; we have found this to be a frequent response in South African. Parents, themselves trapped in

intolerable life situations, often act out their frustration in verbal and physical abuse of their small children. A desperate mother is quoted (Duncan & Rock, 1994) as saying of her obviously malnourished child: "I hit him because he is naughty. He is always crying for bread." The children learn that they are regarded as bad, without having done anything to deserve this label, and may later feel justified in undertaking any self-serving actions, however bad, as appropriate to the identification that was forced upon them. They also express no confidence in their own ability, in due course, to be parents.

Harkness (1993) writes of transgenerational or intergenerational trauma from father to children. She says that even in the comparatively peaceful United States, 50% of the population have a first-degree relative who is a veteran. Effects described include numbed responsiveness and social withdrawal. Quality research needs the advantages American researchers had: a period of trauma to an identifiable and significant group, followed by peace with sufficient prosperity and access to psychiatric/psychological care to enable studies to take place. In the developing world, we lack all those advantages. Harkness says Vietnam veterans with PTSD have a high incidence of divorce, marital discord and domestic violence, high unemployment, drug and alcohol abuse, and suicide. *So does the South African population as a whole.*

The effect may depend on the degree and nature of the child's identification with the parents. In South Africa, many were conflicted. Children rejected their parents' passivity in the face of apartheid and their failure to take effective action to end it (Simpson, 1993a, 1993b). Apartheid severely damaged families. In contrast to the small and schismatic modern nuclear (or postnuclear) North American families, African families (more like European Jewish and Romany families before the Holocaust) were especially vulnerable, as adherents of the concept of *ubuntu,* experiencing the large community as an enlarged, extended family. Harkness writes of Vietnam veterans having disengaged relationships with spouses and families, and of families with a relative absence of structure, order, and authority. Apartheid all too often enforced that. Migratory labor and other pressures forced families to break up, weakened the ties between family members, and greatly reduced opportunities for mutual support and joint problem solving of the traditional sort. Harkness also writes of Vietnam veteran families that "it is not unusual to find a child elevated to a parental-functioning role" (p. 636). We have seen exactly the same situation in South Africa: Young children, in the absence of the parents as breadwinners, away in distant towns, having to become active in the raising of still younger children. This was compounded by what became a growing tendency for the young to take leadership in political activism from their passive elders whose learned helplessness so frustrated the young.

Dawes and Tredoux (1989) reported briefly on children exposed to political violence in a South African squatter community in which, within 3 months, 53 people were killed and 20,000 were made homeless by vigilante attacks. They concentrated on acute effects, but still noted such effects as changed attitudes to the police and effects on socialization. They noted an association between more serious disturbances in children and maternal PTSD. Methodological weaknesses, including very limited measures of other factors, limit the generalizability of these specific findings, but their conclusion that "maternal stress increases the risk of child problems" matches general experience in this country.

MULTIGENERATIONAL TRAUMA AND THE GENESIS OF TERRORISM

A field that has been very largely neglected is the role of prior trauma in the genesis of terrorism and in the motivation of those known as terrorists. Garr (1970) wrote, "Some of the most general explanations of the origins of revolution and other forms of collective violence

attribute it to the loss of ideational coherence: men's loss of faith in, or lack of consensus about, the beliefs and norms that govern social interaction." Taylor and Quayle (1994) have made an interesting contribution on this issue, though wholly outside the traditional boundaries of psychotraumatology. For example, they report a finding that is intriguing when considered in the light of our knowledge of complex PTSD and of damage to the "just-world hypothesis." They write, "The sense of a 'just world' seems to lie at the very heart of the social and psychological response to political violence of both terrorists and their victims" (p. 8). As they recognize, these viewpoints are somehow primarily opposed yet similar in nature. "The sense of remedying injustice which might lead to terrorism *creates* the injustice to the innocent bystander"; and it can thus become the basis for a responsive terrorism of retaliation, immediate or historic. "Often the injustice which initiates terrorism . . . becomes lost under layers and layers of later affronts and perceived injustice, such that the starting point no longer has relevance other than through mythology. But whatever might be the starting point of terrorism, its central quality seems to be that it creates a self-sustaining cycle of injustice which once established, experience suggests is very difficult to break." Terrorists are acting out an unjust-world hypothesis; in a very real sense, they are acting out the characteristics of their trauma experience.

As Taylor and Quayle (1994) emphasize (see also Simpson, 1988), a central element in the terrorist act is the lack of any direct relationship between the victims and the specific political agenda of the organization taking such action. We protest loudly, as we are meant to, at the "innocence" of the victims. Our outrage is precisely the response sought: guilty victims would not be functional. In a sense, they may be acting out the random malignity of the trauma they experienced, and the chord they so deliberately touch in all of us is strictly based on that vulnerability that our "just-world" beliefs create. It illustrates vividly the extent to which society at large holds most trauma victims as somehow to blame for their fate, that when the terrorist skillfully selects dramatically innocent victims, we are especially deeply disturbed. We feel that victims *ought* to deserve their fate, and when it is made too difficult for us to construct some sense of responsibility for them, it is acutely uncomfortable. State or insurgent terrorism uses acts of violence perpetrated against certain targets in order to produce desired effects on quite other people for political purposes. I have previously (e.g., Simpson, 1993a) shown how torture and coercive interrogation in fact represent the careful and deliberate use of trauma in order to induce desired posttraumatic syndromes in the direct targets of such violence. Terrorism deliberately (if usually unwittingly or without fully understanding) uses indirect or secondary traumatization for similarly political ends. That is why terrorism is so intimately concerned with the means of communication (as is excellently discussed by Schmidt & de Graaf, 1982). Where it is unable to attain media access so as to influence the secondary trauma targets, it is ineffective. Although it has been insurgent terrorism used by relatively small and unofficial structures that has attracted the most attention, one must remember that these methods were originally developed and systematically used by the State, notably in the Reign of Terror under Robespierre in France. Only later was the technique privatized.

The victims may be indiscriminate but not arbitrary. It is surely significant that the terrorist act—its timing, methods, and targets—is precisely planned to be incalculable, unpredictable, unexpected, unfathomable, and uncontrollable. Like deliberate disasters, these are acts of man planned to have the impact of Acts of God. Before those components of traumatic stress were formally recognized in DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) they had been embodied in all successful acts of terror. Such deeds always force the larger audience to confront the experience or witness events that cause, or threaten to cause, death or serious

injury to others, and in such a way as to induce fear, horror, and especially a sense of helplessness in those of us who are forced to be bystanders.

Although Taylor and Quayle (1994) are clear that "there seems to be no discernible pathological qualities of terrorists that can identify them in any clinical sense as different from others in the community from which they come," they were looking for obvious psychopathology and not the area I consider most relevant, that of responses to prior loss and trauma. In my forensic work in the last decade, I have had the opportunity to examine closely numerous men who were considered by the State to be terrorists (and by others to be freedom fighters), and have found such experiential themes to be common among them. The unusually detailed interviews with members of Irish and other terrorist groups reported by Taylor and Quayle exemplify themes I found commonplace in South Africa freedom fighters: a sense of community support for long-term involvement in "the troubles," of special comradeship within the structure, of being part of an ongoing response to previous and bitterly remembered acts of the opposite side, and "in an almost intuitive way he [the terrorist] could recognize the continuity of his present behavior with the past" (p. 28). What others see as acts of offense are seen as defenses of the community against external threats and as responses to past acts of violence against that community by the State.

> This appears to have its primary origins in the past through family, cultural, historical and religious traditions. . . . Many terrorist families can give a litany of past events . . . where individual family members have been injured, killed or imprisoned. The present therefore has continuity with the past, and the young person growing in this environment absorbs the ethos of terrorism as part of his early socialisation. (p. 29)

Actions that others see as immoral are seen as morally required responses to the past and future violence of others. They describe a "point of no return," a form of critical psychological boundary of involvement in such a process, which is usually either a personal experience of repression or violence, the death of a friend or acquaintance in a political action or demonstration, or an analogous incident, such as an atrocity, that damaged the community.

The cyclical and intergenerational nature of such community political violence must not be underestimated. Most attempts to stop such violence become pretexts for its continuance. And to South African insurgents, as with the Irish that Taylor and Quayle interviewed, prison is a powerful learning environment for ideological growth. The major prison island used for South African political prisoners is still commonly referred to as "the University of Robben Island."

Fields's studies (1986), among others, suggest that children who grow up in violent societies may show a degree of moral and social retardation, but it is hard to isolate the effects of violence per se and those of the closely related poor social circumstances (see Heskin [1980], referring to Northern Ireland in particular). There are possible differences between the effects of witnessing violence to others, whether strangers or intimates, personally experiencing violence, and participating in violent acts. Some authors predicted that the latter would surely lead to moral breakdown (e.g., Fraser, 1974; Lyons, 1979). Torture is addictive. Any government or security force that gets a good chance to enjoy it rarely gives it up voluntarily. In North America and Europe, there has been a privatization of bestial violence. Those people who truly enjoy maiming and killing others must stick to fantasy or become serial killers. In repressive regimes, they can look forward to a secure government job and pension. As the South African novelist, André Brink, writes (1992), "Once you start using violence to change the world to your liking, you're stuck with violence to keep it going. And there's no way out again" (p. 157).

THE "LOST GENERATION": WHO LOST THEM?
WHERE CAN THEY BE FOUND?

Many generations of children have been proclaimed a "lost generation" (see, e.g., McWhirter & Trew, 1982, on children in Northern Ireland), generally by self-proclaimed experts who propose to find them. Someone should undertake a follow-up study on all the reputedly lost generations. The degree of damage and the implications of irreparable damage seem to have been exaggerated. The Khmer Rouge and the children of Belfast, Beirut, and South Africa have all been labeled as "lost."

A number of rather minor and impressionist surveys have attracted publicity but often contradict each other. Everatt and Orkin (1993) announced that their analysis of South African youth, across all races, showed 5% to be "lost", 27% as "marginalized" (seen as most needing urgent intervention), 43% as "at risk" ("functioning, but showing signs of alienation on a few dimensions of concern") and 25% as "fine" (fully engaged with society, with the authors recommending they be trained "in peer education and leadership"). The report has serious sampling and methodological concerns, and an artificial appearance of accuracy.

Verhulst, Althaus, and Versluis den Bieman (1992) reported a study of 2,148 international adoptees and found that early neglect, abuse, and the number of changes of caretaking environment increased the risk of later maladjustment, but also that the majority of the adoptees—even those with potentially damaging backgrounds—seemed to be functioning well. What, then, are the long-term effects of early exposure to trauma and persecution? Krell (1993) points out the relatively recent recognition of distinct effects of such experiences on children in comparison with adult exposure. In the early literature on child survivors of the Holocaust, there are challenging observations. Friedman (1949), for example, expressed astonishment at "the shallowness of their emotions" after the experience of continuous danger, and Minkowski (1946) spoke of "affective anaesthesia" Krell (1993) reported on 25 child survivors, "the majority of whom were not patients" (which is important, as so many studies are limited both by small numbers and by an exclusive focus on people already in therapy), and he emphasizes that the majority of child survivors lead normal and creative lives. Lasting damage is not inevitable.

Feenstra (1995) reported the results of a 10-year study of the psychological health of post-war children of war victims, concluding emphatically that "a review of the literature compels [one] to make the tentative conclusion that, as yet, no support has been found for the assumption that post-war children of war victims, solely on the basis of the fact that their parents were traumatized in the war, are at higher risk for mental problems." He agrees that the methodologies used so far leave much to be desired and that more research is justified, but the contrast to "lost generation" claims is clear.

POLITICAL CORRECTNESS, DENYING APARTHEID,
AND REQUIRING AMNESIA

Lipstadt (1993), in her notable book *Denying the Holocaust,* has ably reviewed the meretricious and phony propaganda that promotes the obscene myth that the Holocaust never occurred or seeks to minimize its awful realities. She addresses, for instance, the fake scholarly argument used by those who advance this fable by pretending that they are merely presenting "the two sides" of the issue. About the reality of the Holocaust, like the reality of winter and death, there are no "sides": It happened. While there are legitimate differences in one's responses to or explanations of such events, denial of reality is not a "side" in an argument: It is

the refusal to argue, the disguising of facts by those too cowardly to respond to the realities. Lipstadt sees the Holocaust denial phenomenon as part of a neofascist agenda. Frank discussion of such grim events and their consequences is disgustingly misrepresented by some as "hate material" (Lipstadt, p. 15) or as "threatening national healing and reconciliation" (in today's South Africa). In a disguised reversal of truth, the hateful suppression of frank discussion of the results of hatred and conflict is misrepresented as if it somehow *caused* the events it is simply describing. Lipstadt (e.g., pp. 21–22) also discusses how the Holocaust deniers not only deny or minimize grim historic realities, but also argue passionately against the assignment of any blame to any of the participants: Victors and vanquished, perpetrators and victims, are all regarded as equal; essentially (though they usually avoid revealing this logical consequence of their arguments), they would hold that there was no useful moral or other distinction between Hitler and Churchill, between the Gestapo and the Royal Air Force. She discusses the *Historikerstreit* in Germany in the 1980s, in which conservative historians sought to "normalize and relativize" the Nazi period of history.

But, at least, it took decades, some 50 years, before the Holocaust deniers grew strong enough to have any noticeable influence on the understanding of some of those who lacked firsthand knowledge of the denied events. In South Africa, apartheid denial was an extensive official government policy for decades to facilitate the continuation of those crimes against humanity. It has continued unabated and has been adopted by the new "democratic" government. South African history, written as denial propaganda for the decades of official apartheid, is still dishonest. A coercive "political correctness" enforces strong pressure against frank discussion of what has so recently happened. A mother demanding to know who killed her son a year ago is told that she is "raking up the past" and preventing a necessary process of "reconciliation."

Pross (1991) very relevantly reviewed the postwar cover-up of Nazi doctors in Germany, confirming how, after the collapse of a repressive regime, most perpetrators, helpers, and collaborators "manage to survive quite agreeably." Speaking at a Norwegian conference from which South African doctors had been excluded, he appealed to the world medical community not to be fooled again, and to "break the complicity of silence towards contemporary abuses." In fact, none of the South African doctors who behaved dishonorably during the apartheid era have been censured in any way by the South African Medical Association, or by the South African Medical Council, whose own unethical conduct during the bad years was so widely condemned. The Council is still run by appointees of the old regime and has, amazingly, been given the task of reforming itself, free from any participation by its victims.

CONTINUING EFFECTS OF SOCIAL TRAUMA: CONTRASTING EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

We find strong echoes between the Dutch experience after World War II, and our South African experience after Apartheid. Jaffer (1995), acting on my proposal, reviewed how the Dutch dealt with the trauma of the last war, and how South Africa might learn from this. Sachs (1995), in his foreword to Jaffer's booklet, writes,

> The eagerness of the Dutch people to enter a phase of forgetfulness and happiness after the long years of conflict and suffering was understandable. Yet it is quite clear that attempts simply to bury the past because of its unpleasantness had at best temporary success. In the medium and long-term they turned out to be strongly counterproductive. . . . Reconciliation

is far more than a gesture of kindness or courtesy to those who have wronged us. True rec-
onciliation is a deep process that deals with pain through handling the emotions of pain. It is
sufficiently confident of the endeavour to allow genuine memory to express itself. (pp. v–vi)

He reminds us of how the pain of the Anglo–Boer War was kept alive by survivors. At the
Vrouemonument (Women's Monument) is a large inscribed motto in Dutch: WE SHALL NOT FOR-
GET and WE SHALL NOT FORGIVE. As he comments, "The oppressed became the oppressors. When
will the cycle be ended? Only our generation can do it, if we have the courage to face the past
with honesty but without vindictiveness. If pain is unrecorded and unacknowledged, it surfaces
in the most bitter ways and at the most inconvenient moments. The story will never end if it is
suppressed, but finalises itself if it is properly told."

To seek understanding or comprehension of a traumatic past is seen by glib politicians as
standing in the way of economic reconstruction and development, while ignoring the needs of
psychological reconstruction and development. As in Europe in the late 1940s, there is a stead-
fast determination to ignore the extent of the active collaboration of many and the fact that the
resistance was only a small group. In fact, in our situation, although former resistance mem-
bers still suffer, collaborators now enjoy the fruits of the international status the resistance
earned. Just as Germany was suddenly devoid of Nazis, South Africa has hardly anyone who
acknowledges having played any part in apartheid. Jaffer (1995, p. 3) describes the "let's for-
get the past" syndrome. Political opportunism usually dominates. But the Dutch allowed out-
of-court settlements for petty collaborators, with surveillance of the STDP (Stichting Toezicht
Politieke Delinquenten), while thousands more were tried by Special Courts and Tribunals, and
there was dishonorable discharge of thousands of civil servants (with loss of pension). In South
Africa, in strong contrast, all collaborators were guaranteed vastly generous pensions and gen-
erous lump-sum payments. Far more was spent on such rewards for the unworthy than on care
for their victims. The Dutch set up University Purge Boards that inquired into the conduct of
students and professors, and other, similar boards examined the roles played by journalists,
doctors, and lawyers. In South Africa, medical collaborators have been richly rewarded, and
the lawyers who played such an active role in the repression remain at work (if government
employees) and still get the majority of government legal work (if in private practice). Those
who made great sacrifices to fight for human rights during the repressive era have received no
government appointments, contracts, or work. The Dutch provided adequate pensions for the
survivors of repression; South Africa has ensured that no pensions whatsoever will be available
to our survivors.

As Jaffer (1995) has written,

The initial over-emphasis on economic reconstruction and "forgetting the past" only sub-
merged serious problems which then had to be attended to years later—at great human cost
to families. The collective blacking-out of memory did little to help heal the victims. . . . Al-
lowing people to speak about their experiences; recording their experiences for posterity;
publicly acknowledging that damage has been done and wrongs committed is an essential
part of the healing process.

Most reviews of the South African experience (e.g., Levett, 1989) tend to ignore inter-
generational aspects and are largely obsessed with political correctness and doctrinaire politi-
cal interpretations of the trauma experience in terms of dated neo-Marxist political themes, not
so as to understand better the micropolitics and sociopolitical context of the survivor's experi-
ence, but to support standpoints in the internecine warfare of ideologies.

After the 1967 classic, *The Inability to Mourn* (Mitscherlich & Mitscherlich, 1967),
Mitscherlich-Nielson (1993) recently revisited the topic. She describes the "pull of silence" in

postwar Germany concerning Nazi atrocities, by which "guilt and shame were negated," enabling public avoidance of remembrance of (let alone the needed active memory for) the millions of German and non-German war victims. She sees a parallel in the current German situation with hostility toward foreigners, asylum seekers, Jews, and Gypsies also "mutely condoned by a silent majority" She sees this as showing the same denial of shame and guilt, and the same lack of empathy for the poor and underprivileged.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE OF LASTING EFFECTS OF SOCIAL VIOLENCE COMPARED TO OTHER COUNTRIES

Curran (1988) expertly discussed the impact of 18 years of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland and the difficulties involved in competently studying such issues. Despite gloomy predictions that society would be "broken down" under such stresses, he emphasizes that, so far as can be judged from the results of community surveys, hospital admission and referral data, psychotropic drug usage, suicide rates, and assessment of victims, the impact, in his careful phrase "has (not) been judged considerable" This is unlike the situation in South Africa, where every index of social pathology scores high. Among the reasons he discusses for such findings, apart from the underestimated resilience and adaptivity of human beings, are underreporting, migration of the most afflicted and vulnerable, denial and habituation to violence, a possible latency period (as described by Porot, 1957, after the unrest in Algeria), and a possibly cathartic effect of the disinhibition and direct expression of violence. Casper (1995), studying the legacies of authoritarian rule following the Marcos and Aquino eras in the Philippines, as well as examples in Latin America, explored the long impact on society of authoritarianism: the damage to social institutions, for instance, caused by the intervention in politics of the church and/or the military, and the fragility of redemocratization.

It has been commonly observed that neurotic patients often seem to cope better when faced with external stress. Mira (1939), for instance, recorded this during the Spanish Civil War, as did Ierodiakonou (1970) during the civil war in Cyprus, whereas psychotic patients are generally little affected, as Solomon (1995) reported in Israel during the Gulf War. No such effect has been described in South Africa, where mental health services have been so primitively developed that sufficiently sensitive observations, especially of those most exposed to the threat, were not possible. The work of Curran (1989) and others (e.g., Kee *et al.,* 1987) has suggested a limited duration of the impact of civil violence in many cases, at least as regards the duration of formal psychiatric illness. Also intriguing in its implications is the study of Greenley, Gillespie, and Lindenthal (1975) in their study of the impact in New Haven of a period of severe urban rioting, arson, vandalism, and assault. They found that suburban male whites felt significantly psychologically better both during and 2 years after the riot; white females felt no different during the rioting and significantly better later. Neither black men nor black women felt worse during or after the riots. Fogelson (1970), commenting on the American riots of the 1960s, noted "the outpouring of fellow-feeling, of mutual respect and common concern . . . exhilaration so intense as to border on jubilation . . . a sense of pride, purpose and accomplishment. . . . Their common predicament revealed in the rioting, blacks looked again at one another and saw only brothers" We saw a similar sense of cohesion and positive sense of brotherhood and community during the struggle against apartheid, and as that has been replaced by a general era of greed and self-seeking, many greatly miss the positive aspects of the days of struggle.

THE NATURE OF APARTHEID AND ITS TRAUMATIC IMPACT

Other political conflicts have led to wars and similar periods of violence that had secondary effects of damaging family and community structures. Apartheid had the primary effect of damaging those structures: The overt acts of violence were in many senses secondary to that. The Holocaust had as a primary aim the annihilation of the Jews and others deemed unworthy to find a place in the Aryan society. It was prepared to make use of their labor in the service of that primary ideal. Apartheid may have caused the deaths of very large numbers of people, but its principal purpose, though hardly less chilling, was even more ambitious: It was the deliberate creation of an eternal underclass of subservient peoples, providing a docile and cheap workforce for the master race. I call it a more ambitious project in the sense that, at least, people once dead stay dead. Apartheid aimed at keeping them alive and perpetually submissive, tractable and adapted to the needs of others. Verwoerd was very explicit that the function of education of the black majority was precisely that. While human physiology makes it relatively easy to kill large numbers of people, the Afrikaners were to discover that human psychology and sociology makes it far more difficult to transform independent people into happy slaves.

Also, the Afrikaner, in creating apartheid, had to live in a very different world to that which enabled the Nazis to act out their ignoble aims: an international environment changed by the experience of the horrors of the Holocaust, such as to make it somewhat more difficult to get away with genocide and similarly gross aims (difficult, but far from impossible, as experience has shown, in Cambodia, and Rwanda). But the Afrikaner enterprise was in no way limited by scruples or tenderheartedness, nor any moral considerations, nor by any cautions imposed by their endlessly compliant churches and academics. Rather, as economists talk of maximal sustainable output or profit, the Afrikaners, with great skill and the use of warped scientific knowledge and the deliberate induction of trauma, achieved maximal sustainable repression, the greatest degree of repression they could get away with in the modern world. And their hegemony lasted much longer than the Third Reich.

The ability of black families and communities to cope with the violence and to provide a functionally nurturing ambience for child development was greatly impaired by the requirements of apartheid. Communities were uprooted and displaced (ethnic cleansing long before Bosnian Serbs adopted the technique), and their homes were bulldozed flat. Social norms were damaged by economic conditions enforcing migrant labor. Forced to live in very poor-quality housing, usually in "locations" distant from the place of work, parents often had to leave home at 3:00 or 4:00 A.M. in order to reach their workplace by 7:00 A.M., getting home well after dark. Thus, even in theoretically intact families, there could be very limited contact. Overcrowding, poor services, crime-ridden neighborhoods—all these are well-known in every country. But rarely are such conditions deliberately planned and forcibly executed by acts of government, and seldom are people confined to such circumstances by the force of law rather than economic pressure. Unable to rebel effectively against the tyranny experienced, many frustrations inflamed internecine violence. As Emily Brontë (1847) wrote in *Wuthering Heights:* "The tyrant grinds down his slaves and they don't turn against him, they crush those beneath them"

PARALLELS WITH THE ANGLO–BOER WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

Even at the time of the Anglo–Boer War in South Africa at the turn of the century, the potential for multigenerational effects was recognized. Joseph Chamberlain (1896), not long before the war, warned in the British Parliament that such a war "would leave behind

it the embers of a strife which I believe generations would hardly be long enough to extinguish" Kruger (1958) remarked that the Jameson Raid, which helped precipitate that war, "injected into race relations more poison than the past sixty years have been able to eliminate, especially as the Boer has an Irishman's memory" (p. 35). It is widely forgotten that the British Army in South Africa faced the first modern war, with many new features later to become routine, especially guerrilla warfare. It devised responses also due to be widely imitated, such as a scorched earth policy and the invention of the concentration camp. Commenting on the lasting effects of such methods, Kruger says that "if some of his Boer descendants are reproached for remembering bitterness too long . . . to the Boer the war was not over . . . it refined a consciousness of their national identity previously less coherent or passionate" (p. 376).

The concentration camps were intended to concentrate Boer women and children in specific places, to provide care for them while preventing them from providing support to their menfolk who were fighting. They were, at first, ineptly run, with a high death rate from disease: One in five inhabitants died within a year, especially children. Lloyd George, the British opposition politician prophesied that "a barrier of dead children's bodies will pile up between the British and Boer races in South Africa" There was much exaggerated propaganda about the camps, perhaps later influencing the disastrous minimizing of reports of the awful truth about German concentration camps in World War II. In fact, living conditions were so precarious, and the incidence of disease so rife among those attempting to stay at home, that, eventually, Boer leaders actually encouraged their families to move into the British camps (General Botha said, "We are only too glad to know that our women and children are under British protection" [p. 462]). The death rate in the camps dropped greatly with reorganization, and conditions became sufficiently favorable that British leadership was worried that this provision helped the guerrillas significantly. It is too easily forgotten that some two-thirds of the enormous number of British Army fatalities in the Boer War were also due to infectious disease. There was often deliberate encouragement of lasting enmity. Lord Kitchener (e.g., Kruger, 1958, p. 438), suggested whipping up hatred between those Boers who had surrendered and those still fighting, "so that they would in future hate each other more than the British."

The parallels are intriguing. Corruption was rife in the government of President Kruger, as it was in the Afrikaner governments of the apartheid era. The Boer War also ended by negotiation, and inconclusively, without a conclusive defeat of the Boers, although they were wholly unable to win. Then, too, the Boers achieved all they needed in the generous terms allowed after their defeat. The Boer War was also followed by a highly controversial amnesty, but that amnesty was expressly limited to those who had not broken the rules of civilized war, unlike the current South African amnesty, which is expressly designed to benefit those who broke such rules and committed war crimes.

It is unfortunate that there are so few recorded observations of the direct psychological impact of this war, as it offers a good opportunity to contrast the effects of two very different military systems facing the same highly traumatic war events. The British had an extremely rigid system, allowing very little autonomy to the men actually at risk, giving great power to some of the most barmy military commanders of recent history, such as Buller, while the Boers, with great advantage, encouraged individual initiative. The British system led to appalling troop losses due to their obtuse leaders persistently snatching defeat from the jaws of victory; to the consternation of their leadership as well as their opponents, the Boer system led to unpredictability.

THE POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPERIENCING
TRAUMA AND CAUSING IT

The issue of whether individuals who have been traumatized later become perpetrators of violence toward others is still controversial, but it seems that whereas most victims of trauma do not later become prime causes of violence toward others, some do, and trauma victims are overrepresented in numerous studies of perpetrators of various kinds. There is little clarity as to what determines what happens to individual victims. On the broader social scale of responses to trauma, the cycle of recursive violence is clearer though less remarked upon. One might naively imagine that after the experience of severe victimization, a people would say, in effect, "Never again! After our experience, we will try to ensure that this will never happen again to anybody. We won't do such things to anyone."

But, sadly, the more common response is "To Hell with anyone else: We are prepared to become perpetrators in our turn, to inflict on others what we suffered earlier, to protect our own sense of security." Perhaps political processes are all too often more adept at compounding and reflecting the more ignoble elements of our individual personalities.

In the South African example in earlier centuries, the Boers had cheerfully killed large numbers of black people (even observing the date of one of their greatest massacres as a holy holiday until 1994), displacing populations and destroying societies. Then, in their wars with Britain, the Boers themselves suffered defeat and humiliation, and damage to their fledgling, crude, and fragile culture. Devouring their own propaganda, the Boers passionately embraced the identity of victim, gathering international support for their cause. They discovered the potential power provided by exploiting the status of victim, and the role, since profitably elaborated by others, of professional victims who feel perpetually entitled and empowered to do anything, at whatever cost to others, to promote their own sectional interests. Abu-Lughod (1990) demonstrates relevant parallels between the responses of the British Colonial administration in Palestine and the more recent Israeli responses to the Intifada.

THE PLIGHT OF THE SURVIVOR IN THE "NEW" SOUTH AFRICA

Like the "flight into health" so psychoanalytically familiar, South Africans' current "flight into reconciliation" is also phony, flimsy, and avoidant of reality rather than healthy. Survivors feel a strong sense of betrayal, loss, and abandonment as their experience and histories are ignored, and feel even more hopeless than during the worse years of apartheid. Now that the world has decided, whatever the facts of the situation, that there is no problem remaining in South Africa, they have no audience for any complaints, and no support is available. Danieli (1993 and elsewhere) wrote of the *conspiracy of silence:* In South Africa, this is not merely a psychological mechanism, it has been imposed. As Bettelheim (1984, p. 166) wrote, "What cannot be talked about can also not be put to rest; and if it is not, the wounds continue to fester from generation to generation." Danieli (1984, and elsewhere) eloquently described the countertransference problems of therapists who were themselves not involved in the Holocaust, when confronted with survivors. In South Africa, there are no such therapists: Most played an active role in our national tragedy, mostly on the side of the perpetrators or, at least, as very helpful bystanders whose passivity was a necessary precondition for the success of apartheid. They are unlikely to be able to appreciate the problems of the survivors, and survivors will not trust them as therapists. Vietnam veterans experienced difficulty at

times in trusting the Veterans Administration as a source of help. This problem is far greater in South Africa.

It must be remembered that the worst period of apartheid lasted for over 50 years, with many of its nastiest features being nearly a century old. This has been a very long conflict. Although in America there are studies of the multigenerational ripples of a single, comparatively brief episode of trauma, however awful, on succeeding generations living in peace and prosperity and with abundant therapy available, we are looking at multigenerational effects in which the trauma has lasted through three or four generations. We have yet to have any postwar generations.

AMNESTY OR AMNESIA?

Truth Commissions, set up to investigate periods of human rights abuses, are often lauded as if they were a form of therapy for multigenerational trauma. But many have failed (Hayner, 1994), and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission is showing consistent flaws, including conspicuous lack of expertise. While making generous provision for privacy and protection for perpetrators (whose pensions are guaranteed), and making pathetically limited provision for any form or care or restitution for survivors (only temporarily at best, and only if funds can be found), it carefully removes the victims' rights to all forms of redress against admitted and known perpetrators, even preventing any form of civil action against them. The law establishing it explicitly breaches international law in the extreme care it takes to provide for comprehensive exoneration of those found responsible for crimes against humanity. After a period when the whole system of laws served to protect the strong from the weak, and, rather than serving justice and morality, often required injustice and immorality, the proposed Bill of Rights was preceded by this Bill of Wrongs.

Although most states and people deplore "crimes against humanity" as the worst of human crimes, these are the most rarely punished of all. Of all categories of criminal, none is so likely to be zealously protected and rewarded or to retire on a fat pension. This fact, which makes a mockery of all Human Rights charters, compounds the continuing damage suffered by the victims of such abuses.

Helplessness and powerlessness are the essential insults of trauma, and amnesty imposes perpetual helplessness and powerlessness on the victims. It demands that the unspeakable shall remain unspoken. The conflict between denial and testimony is the central dialectic of psychological and social trauma. But as the folklore of all peoples insists, such ghosts will not rest in premature and hasty graves until their story has been told. Healing of individuals and of societies requires remembrances, truth, revelation, repentance, recognition, and mourning for what has been lost. Even divine forgiveness, in most traditions, is not unconditional and must be earned by confession, repentance, and atonement. In South Africa, identification with the aggressor is now official State policy, enforcing a compulsory happy ending.

EPILOGUE: THE SECOND BULLET ... TO KILL A SECOND TIME?

Yet there are transcendent moments. I recall a young black cleric (Anonymous, personal communication, 1988) with whom I was working on a project in Soweto. Late one night, he began recalling his experiences in detention. After a particularly brutal session, his chief interrogator began to jeer at him and to promise an endless misery. "Don't forget," he gloated, "not only will I interrogate you forever, but my children will interrogate your children, and

my grandchildren will interrogate your grandchildren." After a brief pause, the young man replied, "I am so sorry to hear that you have so very little ambition in life."

Survival imposes a heavy burden. We are now closer relatives of the dead, and we are obligated to speak for them. We are their true memorials; for many, we are their only memorials. "Do not forget us when we are gone: The only place where we can still live in peace is in your memories" (Simpson, 1993c). As Wiesel (1993) wrote, we are duty-bound to try to communicate what we know of such events, because "not to do so would mean to forget. To forget would mean to kill the victims a second time. We could not prevent their first death; we must not allow them to vanish again. Memory is not only a victory over time, it is also a triumph over injustice" (p. 14).

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