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Children of Nazis A Psychodynamic Perspective

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The Nazi disaster—the most devastating period in German history for the lives, the culture, and the souls it ruined—is still only a marginal subject in German psychological research. In fact, up to the early 1980s, there were hardly any scientific publications. There are probably three reasons for the lack of research about this topic in Germany: (1) the long time of latency between the end of the Nazi area in 1945 and the beginning of the investigations in the 1980s; (2) the absence of theory to conceptualize the research data; and (3) the fact that *all* the investigators in Germany are part of the problem they are investigating.

Only after a long period of latency, starting in the early 1980s, have there been German investigations about “Children of Nazis.” In 1982, for the first time, German scientists wrote on this topic in the American publication *Generations of the Holocaust* (Bergmann & Jucovy, 1982; Eckstaedt, 1982; Hardtmann, 1982; Rosenkötter, 1982). It took another 13 years until a German publisher took the risk to translate and republish in Germany extracts from this important book. Peter Sichrovski published his moving interviews with children of Nazis in 1987. And strong media interest was roused in Germany when Niklas Frank displayed in public the conflict with his father, who had been the chief of *Generalgouvernement* Poland from 1939 until 1945, and had been sentenced to death in 1946 (Frank, 1987).

Dörte von Westernhagen (1987), a German journalist, conducted considerable research over several years in order to reconstruct the biography of her father, who had been a member of the *Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler* and had died as a soldier toward the end of the war. In a very vivid and sensitive way, the reader received an example of how the second generation labored to save what could be saved from the ruins of the Third Reich. The desire to comprehend her father, to get access to the inconceivable, to do justice to him and to her own wishes and disappointed longings, were laid open.

For years, Bar-On interviewed children of leading Nazis. He listened to them, individually and in groups, starting out with entirely German groups, later counseling mixed groups of the second and third generation of German children of persecutors and Jewish children of survivors from the United States and Israel. He described in detail the everyday experiences of the

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Nazi children with their fathers and mothers, their unfulfilled hopes, their yearnings and disappointments, and their attempts, over and over again, to understand what was going on inside the psyche of their parents, their fathers' especially (Bar-On, 1989).

Naturally, all these investigators were initially concerned with saving the historical facts by exploring the specific experiences and events and preparing documentary material. Ready-made theoretical concepts to process and sort out the observations were not at hand. In the human science perspective, Bar-On tried to use the concepts of "partial relevance" by Rokeach (1968) and Tetlock (1979), and the psychoanalytic concept of "working through" (Freud, 1914), and tried to draw theoretical conclusions from the "Milgram experiment" (Milgram, 1963). Recent field studies in France on right-wing youngsters and their ethnic conflicts utilize concepts of marginalization and concepts describing the process of acculturation or deculturation of French or Algerian adolescents in today's France. Certain social, not individual, factors are emphasized, above all employment, self-sufficiency, and the social appreciation connected thereto, that even out ethnic differences. The ethnic factors gained importance—in a process of "ethnification"—the more the social conditions deteriorated (Dubet & Lapeyronnie, 1992).

A great problem in Holocaust research seems to be that different sciences (psychology, sociology, history, educational and political science) are investigating and explaining different parts of the phenomenon. But the whole phenomenon is not susceptible to a reliable interpretation. This need to cover the whole phenomenon is seemingly compensated on occasion by professional narcissism. The investigators try to sell a fraction as the whole and draw conclusions that are trespassing the boundaries of their special discipline. The uniqueness of the Holocaust seems to be unconsciously viewed as a provocation, urging a need to counter the incomprehensible with an—if late and ex-post but comprehensive—understanding. There is, and remains, some discomfort and frustration, however, that the different observations and conclusions cannot be joined in an integrated concept. A large number of details do not necessarily create a complete, whole picture.

Such efforts can be observed also with some psychotherapists who attempted to draw a complete portrait of the Führer's psychic structure using only fractional accounts (Miller, 1980; Stierlin, 1975). Focused only on the individual, they neglected the fact that National Socialism and the splitting of German society into Aryans and non-Aryans and projective identification, starting as early as 1933, was a collective effort Hitler could not have performed alone, even had he wished to. Working alliances between different disciplines could be helpful to avoid such misunderstandings.

Early on in my investigations, I gained much insight from studying the perspective of the victims observing the perpetrators. Ruth Klüger's description (1992) of a baker's daughter in Vienna maliciously frightening a Jewish child illegally visiting the cinema demonstrates that during the Nazi period, every "Aryan" person—even the children—had the power to persecute "non-Aryan" people. Any kind of mischievous, even playful, attitude against minorities was legalized and promoted by the authorities. Many people used this empowerment in their everyday lives (Goldhagen, 1996).

Primo Levi (1988) described how, in the concentration camp during mutual working hours, he was seemingly treated normally as a chemist by his German colleague, but later—abruptly—like a cheap object, dead and worthless. The relationship on the part of the persecutor was not determined by personal feelings, affection, or dislike, or even neutrality, but rather by impersonal conditions that he accepted completely: As a colleague, Primo Levi deserved to be treated as a colleague; as a prisoner, he did not deserve any respect. Like a chameleon, the colleague adapted his personal conduct completely to the social structure. But

the social environment only proposed certain behavioral regulations, yet never compelled or forced people to abide by them.

A German court, in the case of a Jewish survivor seeking reparations, ruled that children who spent the first 3 years of their lives in a concentration camp could not have suffered any lasting traumatization or psychic damage, because they did not have conscious memory of that time. This conclusion has been proven wrong by Judith Kestenberg (1982) through numerous interviews. These children especially showed severe and quasipsychotic disturbances. This court's statement reveals more about the perpetrators than the victims. Following the logic of this court, children up to 3 years of age could be subjected to any psychic torture and injury without lasting effects.

The differentiating reports of the victims show that there was some freedom of choice during the Nazi period, even in the concentration camps. In their reports, the victims distinguish between guards who used their instructions to torture the prisoners, and others who preserved for themselves a small degree of humanity (Müller-Münch, 1982).

NAZI CHILDREN'S TRAUMA

My investigations are based solely on German children of the second and third generation. Their parents shared the National Socialist ideology and actively supported the persecution as far as their personal power and influence permitted. They had collaborated by denouncing Jews to the police, boycotting their businesses, expelling and banishing Jewish colleagues, and using concealed or open force as white-collar perpetrators in the administration, in the Gestapo, in concentration camps, or as members of an *Einsatzkommando* (special *Wehrmacht* execution units). Some of them were sentenced to death after 1945 and were executed; others lived in Germany incognito, often under false names, well into the 1950s and 1960s. Some even revealed themselves involuntarily through their own publications, as if they no longer had seriously considered personal criminal prosecution. After the war, most of them had merged inconspicuously into the German society from which they had initially emerged. None of the mothers and fathers had been guilty of criminal acts after 1945. This means that we are dealing with a phenomenon in which people who behaved lawfully under normal political conditions, used and abused their power under National Socialist rule to single out, humiliate, torture, and kill innocent citizens of their own country who had done them no harm.

The murder of the Jews began by giving them a bad name, "murdering their reputation"¹ through the propaganda of the Nazis that split the German people into Jews and Aryans, disparaging one and idealizing the other. Only a few Germans resisted this effort. It left traces as early as 1933 in everyday life. What started in the neighborhood, in the housing area, in the village, and in the city ended in Auschwitz. This knowledge was not passed on openly in the family narration; it nevertheless exists. To the question of what in the everyday life of their parents and grandparents could have been useful for Hitler in executing his plans for extermination, students of the third generation, interviewed in 1989, answered, "That's a mean question." It was "mean" because it aimed at the nucleus of the problem: the collaboration of many, indeed almost all, of the people in Germany. It was acknowledged only upon direct and specific questioning; otherwise, a veil of silence covered up the crimes.

Even if National Socialism was described in the families, the Holocaust was not mentioned. Instead, stories of everyday life during the war were told. German children relying only

¹*Rufmord* in German.

on family narration for their knowledge of National Socialism would have had a fragmentary and deceiving, and thus false, picture. Even the complete defeat of 1945 was sometimes turned into a victory in family narration. It was called a “honorably defeat against a world full of enemies.” Thanks to the intense historical research of scientists, passed over to the children by teachers and journalists, there is now, however, a knowledge of facts in the second and third generation.

My investigations are based on the following:

- Observations of the second and third generation in psychoanalytic treatment since 1976 (Hardtmann, 1982).
- Counseling a self-help group of children of Nazi functionaries in 1988 and 1989.
- Interviews with students of the third generation in East and West Berlin in 1988 and 1989.
- Social training courses with right-wing, radical delinquent youngsters in Berlin since 1991.

The material therefore derives from different sources. These observations can be compared to different microscopic adjustments and enlargements: The pictures perceived therein are connected but not congruent. The most superficial material is from the interviews, because the contact was very brief. The material that goes deeper is that from the self-help groups, because all members were tied together by a mutual experience—suffering from the Nazi fathers and mothers, as well as that based on observations in social training courses with the right-wing radical delinquent youth. However, I owe the deepest and farthest reaching revelations to my patients in psychoanalytic treatment, who suffered extremely from their parents’ and their childhood experiences because they could not deal with them. They brought these experiences unprocessed into the treatment sessions and suffered deep affective disturbances and psychosomatic disorders. They felt insecure in the realistic perception of the self, because, in their childhood, they had been, again and again, exposed to parental projection and projective identification.

FAMILY DYNAMICS

I begin by describing the childhood experience of a patient. As a five-year-old child of a former SS leader, born after the war, one morning he went to get breakfast rolls from the bakery with the dog and let the dog carry the bag of rolls in his mouth. The father watched them through the window and saw that the bag was dragging in the dirt. With the words “I shall teach you to drag the one who gives you bread² through the dirt,” he hit the child so hard that he had to be hospitalized with a broken arm.

I met this child as a grown-up in my office after he failed a university exam. He was pale and frightened, depressive, and lacking any self-confidence. Only after long treatment did the patient manage to get a grip on life. After the anxieties toward the father and the projection of these anxieties onto the examiners had been worked through, the patient finished his studies with an excellent exam.

This simple example shows typical characteristics of the *structure of relationship* between the first and second generation. The first generation—defeated, debased, returning from

²Bread in German being the synonym for subsistence, hence the one giving bread, *der Brötchengeber* as characteristic of the father.

the World War II laden with guilt and shame—suffered from chronically deficient self-esteem. Normally, these feelings were warded off with denial and reaction formation, for instance, with arrogance. In certain moments, beyond apprehension for children, the defense collapsed, and the fathers, suddenly overwhelmed with feelings, projected them onto the children, who felt like blind people slapped in the face. They found themselves abruptly and unpreparedly in a *quasipsychotic world* and were exposed to destructive action with which the fathers fought off their presumed “persecutors”—in this example, the (presumed) “despiser.” In some cases, these children indeed later on turned into “persecutors”; the vast majority, however, had identified with the projections and had, in place of their parents, developed feelings of guilt and shame themselves. *Projections* and *projective identifications* determined the object relationships in their families. When the children became subject to negative projections, they saw themselves as the *Jews* of their parents.

Occasionally, the whole family would symbiotically join together (*folie à famille*) and project their own denied parts outward onto a third person. In this case, tight family ties between the generations were formed, which impeded the separation and individuation of the children, so important in adolescence. The mutual defenses—denial, splitting, and projection—tied the members of the family together like a sect because of the danger of being radically questioned outside the family. I observed similar phenomena with right-wing radical delinquents. The *Weltanschauung*, splitting, idealization of the self, disparagement of foreigners, and unquestioned anti-Semitism—almost word for word and entirely uncritically—had been taken over by them according to their own statements from their grandparents.³

Another characteristic was the *concrete* or *literal thinking* in the sense of *symbolic equations* (Segal, 1979), which occurred *along* with the symbolic thinking. This is important because the thinking apparatus as such was not disturbed but very much intact. Apparently, as Kestenbergl has also noted with the children of the victims, the psychosis-like thinking structures differ from those of actual psychotic patients. Under the influence of strong, suppressed feelings that suddenly became relevant—an overflowing with affects—a *regression of thinking* took place. The breakfast rolls no longer symbolized the provider (*Brötchengeber*); they were literally equated with the provider, the father. The five-year-old was accused of having dragged the father in the dirt. This regression in the thinking of grown-ups is extremely frightening for children, because it translates into a language of concrete thought and action what really is a metaphorical language. Due to the strong emotion paralyzing the critical ability and the associated repelling, unpleasant self-perception, the actions were mostly of a destructive nature. The threat of such unforeseeable impulsive action lay like a shadow over the childhood of members of the second generation and paralyzed their healthy self-maintenance and their own aggression. The latter generally turned against the self in the sense of an identification with the aggressor (Freud, 1965). Because the children could not comprehend the biographical and historical context in which their parents’ sudden emotional, erratic, and chaotic outbursts could be explained, they lived in an imperceptible world where the connection between certain feelings and specific incidents remained hidden. Some of them generally perceived emotions and affects as irrational, something that one can only fight, suppress, and control, but cannot use in a sensible way to understand more about oneself.

The *suppression of the feelings* led to an inner paralysis, a loss of liveliness, and a diffuse incapability in situations when difficult decisions in life had to be made. The children remained foreign to themselves, felt “alien in their own house,” in their body, and in their soul, in some cases developing psychosis-like symptoms and symptoms of a split personality or a false self.

³Statements like these were very often heard: “My grandfather/grandmother or my father/mother told me . . .”

One patient, whose father had served in an *Einsatzkommando*, as an adult visited those places where her father had participated in shootings. At these places, she did not feel any emotion, whereas films—fiction!—often drew her tears. She suffered much from that and developed severe psychic and somatic defects, because she could not separate true and false, real and unreal, emotions. She could not acknowledge to herself or to others what was play/fantasy and what was earnest/reality. Sometimes she behaved like the mad farmer who calls the firefighters when there is a fire on the theater stage, but who is sound asleep as his own roof is ablaze.

One interviewee reported that in her family, a macabre “play” was even today enacted over and over again: The father, who hadn’t been a Hitler-boy due to his young age, made grand Führer-speeches to the family, asserting that Germany was still “number one” in the world. The family had to listen silently without talking back. Whoever protested against this ritual, as did the only son, was kicked out. The speeches contained three recurring ideas:

- He saw himself surrounded by a world of enemies (paranoia).
- He felt himself superior to everybody else (omnipotence).
- He could not find peace until all “enemies” (the Jews) were eliminated (destructive fantasy).

He was incapable of turning his eyes inward and asking himself what enemies were threatening him from the inside and against what enemies did he have to prove constantly his superiority. He had to ward off feelings of weakness permanently, because he fought a hopeless battle on the wrong front—against the enemies on the outside, not on the inside—that robbed him of his peace until the end of his life. Self-observation and self-criticism were completely alien to him. This ego weakness did not prevent him from being extraordinarily successful on the job; it was thus only partial.

In the self-help group, the children of the second generation discussed their experiences with their Nazi fathers and mothers. Therein, they often described splitting:

- A father who had grown up in a parsonage was able to sing “The Daughter Zion”⁴ with the child and simultaneously to be actively involved in the persecution of the Jews.
- A father and Nazi officer, deeply concerned with the scholastic career of his son, also made him spy on his teachers and at the end of the war ordered him (and the whole family) to be killed, an order luckily never executed.
- A mother had her children set the Christmas table for years after 1945 for “father returning from captivity,” even though she knew he had been executed in 1946.
- A “loving father” was revealed in a war-crime trial to be a mass murderer.

None of the fathers and mothers had the courage, in view of the children, to face openly their own deeds. Silence, hiding, deceit, and lies were thereby inevitable, and undermined—often recognized only in retrospect—not only the trust in the parents but also trust in human relationships altogether. Who was to be trusted if one had been deceived and betrayed by one’s closest relatives? Furthermore, fathers only known through fractional family narration had their identity completed by their children’s wishful imagination and thereby turned into *phantom fathers*, with whom the children satisfied their yearning for a father to be respected and loved, at least in their imagination.

⁴Lyrics by Heinrich Ranke (1798–1876), set up to music by Georg Friedrich Händel, 1747:

Tochter Zion, freue dich, jauchze laut Jerusalem!
Sieh, dein König kommt zu dir, ja, er kommt der Friedefürst!
Hosianna, Davids Sohn! Sei begrüßet, König mild.

THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS

From the psychoanalytic standpoint, the most helpful to me were the concepts of projective identification by Klein (1952), Bion (1967) and Segal (1979). The denial and splitting preceding projection are, by my account, not yet symptoms of illness in the social and political context, as long as the subject remains open to the self-reliance and independence of the object, and as long as the object can actively resist the projection. In this context, Bion talks about *normal projection*, which happens every day and can be corrected at any time, and usually is corrected. Projections become pathological and politically dangerous only when the subject compulsorily identifies the object with projection, depriving it of independence. Such a distorted and, in the sense of the projection perceived, *bizarre object* (Bion, 1967) is *compulsorily identified* with the projection and treated accordingly. It is either disparaged or idealized, perceived and treated as the devil and the ultimate evil or as the incarnation of divinity and goodness. The subject thereby saves itself from a critical argument with the evil (or the good) within itself or the other. It pays for this *loss of self* with a false, usually idealized, self-image and an unrealistic and overweening self-assumption.

Such splitting becomes necessary if the subject cannot accept itself the way it is. The reasons are

- False because of too high and exaggerated expectations toward itself, in the sense of illusions of megalomania, and lowered self-esteem (with depressive personalities).
- An exceedingly unloving, punishing, and depreciating, unloving superego authority, which is surrendered—like formerly the heathenish gods—to devour a foreign object in place of the own self. To save one own's skin from the inner persecutor, the other is sacrificed, thereby serving as a scapegoat.

In both cases, a healthy and “sufficiently good” (Winnicott, 1958) self-love is missing. This self-esteem was not acquired in the family socialization and, even in the second and third generation, its absence leads to an alternation between over- and underestimating the self. The person does not manage to deal with faults, weaknesses, and good qualities, and to develop a realistic and healthy self-perception. Through *projective identification*, the projections are materialized and specified. They thereby leave the sphere of mere fantasy, become relevant to action, and produce effects with which, rather than with thoughts and mere imaginations, the subject must come to terms. Fantasies generally, if they are not relevant for action, do not leave traces in the outside world. They can therefore, even if they are important for the self and trigger feelings of shame and guilt, be put off easily. We all know the feeling experienced when waking from a nightmare, relieved that we have *just* dreamt. Actions can neither be revoked nor erased by a mere act of the imagination. They are withdrawn from the sole power of the subject by the fact that they cannot be renounced and develop a life of their own. The effects of a violent act, for instance, are visible and tangible. One can erase the traces, as the Nazis tried to do, and smear the references, but one cannot make it undone. Hannah Arendt (1967, 1971) has pointed out that historic facts, as opposed to those in natural science, can be lied away successfully to the extent that no trace is left in the memory of the people. In the helpless attempt to escape the effects of action, the only way left for the subject is to blot out the traces from his or her memory. Such thought could have been contained in the *Endlösung* (the “final solution,” the Nazis’ 1942 resolution for the extermination of the Jews). Surely today, we would know much less about the crimes committed in the concentration camps had some prisoners not survived to give evidence. Surely also, many Nazi crimes have long fallen into oblivion.

The subject, however, would try to obtain liberation through oblivion from something that actually happened, loses a part of its history, and therefore a part of its identity. In this way, the subject walks around *without a shadow* and becomes “face- and history-less” (Speier, 1987) and is yet permanently in restlessness and fear of being caught by its own shadow and its true face. It thereby enters a paranoid situation in which what is fantasized had a real cause, but in the past. The subject falls back on mechanisms that have proven effective with dreams, treating reality as if it were only a bad dream. Victims then appear like in a “movie”; they are thereby again erased by *derealization*. In this way, some fathers were even able to talk to their children about their crimes.

The self, mutilated and amputated by projection, is permanently threatened from the inside by the reappearance of the suppressed parts, and from the outside by the fact that the object normally resists the projective identification. It thus lives in a two-front war, threatened from both the inside and the outside, cleft and torn from itself. Cure would only be possible if an inner reconciliation and a destruction of the false self-image took place.

The bloated, omnipotent self resists this for different reasons:

- It feels flatteringly uprated with this false self-image and experiences the devaluation as a devastating defeat, because it does not have any loving parts that could alleviate and stop the fall. It thus suffers from fears of annihilation.
- The false self feels at home only in itself; its loss is not only experienced as a threat and collapse, but also as homelessness.

It thus attempts for all to maintain the projections and forces others to confirm them. Thereby, the projections appear like an outer reality.

For the children, the second generation in Germany, this means that they grew up with partially “face- and history-less parents.” Insofar as they have identified with them, as, for instance, the right-wing radical youth, their own identity depends on an illusionary and brittle foundation. It is difficult for them to develop a defined identity of their own, to live a different history, and show a different face. To the extent that they develop this identity, they have to question the parental models and thus the yearning and loving feelings attached to them. They are orphans inside, reliant on surrogate mothers and fathers. The story of these surrogate mothers and fathers has not yet been written. From the psychoanalyst’s perspective, it is not rare for the psychoanalyst to take over that function.

The process necessary for reparation of the self could also be described in terms of Edith Jacobson’s theory on psychotic identifications (1954) and Margaret Mahler’s considerations about the restitutive aspects of individuation (Mahler & Furrer, 1968). The different theoretical concepts concerning the interchange between internal world and external reality are well described by Kernberg (1980).

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THERAPY

First, there must be special concern with projective mechanisms in therapy, be it by projection of parts of the self, or be it by projective transference by the patient identifying the therapist with a real object of the past. A *stable sense of reality* on the side of the therapist and *permanently open communications* about the projective character of affects, thoughts, and fantasies are much more important than to give early interpretations, in order to establish *stable self- and object-boundaries*. Second, the therapist must not fear *psychotic-like communications* by the patient, because they are not expression of a severely disturbed thinking apparatus but

an expression of severely disturbed separation and individuation processes of the patient as a child; in other words, they are the result of the traumatic childhood experience of the patient. The origins therefore can be drawn back into the past by psychoanalytic exploration.

Third, the *setting depends very much on the patient*, because it is he or she who just must come in contact with his or her traumatization. Therefore it is better to give the patient time to develop a feeling of how many sessions are needed and over how long a period of time. It is my experience that every patient has not only his individual fate but also his *individual way of getting out*.

Fourth, but in special moments when the patient endures severe psychic pain, anger, and fear of loss because of the inevitably necessary but extremely harmful separation process (Mahler & Furrer, 1968) it is important to *encourage him or her no longer to deny but to confront the traumatizing experience* and work it through in the therapeutic alliance.

CONCLUSIONS

National Socialism left traces in the children of the victims and the perpetrators. Denial, splitting, projection, and projective identification are not only characteristics of the perpetrators during the Nazi period. These defense mechanisms were also maintained after 1945. Through denial and splitting, the majority of the German people entered an alliance with the Nazis against the Jewish minority in 1933. Thereby, they spared themselves from a critical argument with themselves and their own failures.

The children of the second generation have become objects of their parents' splitting and projective identification. They then lived either as projectively distorted, bizarre objects in a quasipsychotic world, or they shared these projections and thus became incapable of finding an independent identity of their own. Traces of the former identification are found in numerous physical and psychic symptoms; traces of the latter are found in uncritical symbiotic family ties (*folie à famille*). For cure, both groups depend on searching for objects of positive identification outside the family, because their parents never worked through their own shame and guilt.

On the subject's side, not only did splitting and projection take place during the national socialist period, but, above all, projective identifications. These became relevant for everyday action and led to an active implementation of the Nazi ideology into concrete destructive actions. In the families, the responsibility for what happened was retroactively denied, and thus a paranoid structure in the postwar years—now perpetuated—was established after the outer pressure for conformity had ceased. The suppressed parts, feelings of guilt and shame, were projected either onto the second generation or onto third-party outsiders (anti-Semitism *due to* Auschwitz).

Owing to the aftereffects of the National Socialist crime, the psychotic-like behavior in large groups (*folie nationale*) should be further explored. Temporary, literal identification of metaphors, for example, of the nation with the "father" and the "mother," splitting, and desire for blending correspond with quasipsychotic transferences, yet earlier than individuation and separation. It can be used for *inner politics* also, such transferring the responsibility for one's destructiveness onto the "Führer." Political power can be drawn from misuse of this longing, something that demagogues such as Hitler and Goebbels knew very well. They could support their power not only over all those who thought and felt in an anti-Semitic way and thereby share their projective identifications, but also over those who by no means thought in an anti-Semitic way but had not grown adult enough to take responsibility for themselves. Both the anti-Semitic agitation speeches and the adjuration of the spiritual unity of the German people by the Nazis had to find an inner resonance within the listeners in order to take effect.

There were cases in which this resonance did not come forth and people had proven resistant to Nazi propaganda and resisted splitting. The resistance sprang from three sources:

1. From love of the other who was made a compulsory object of the projection by the Nazis; that was the case with many "Aryan" women who were married to Jewish men.
2. From love of oneself, one's self-reliance and independence, which revolted against a splitting between the inner beliefs in norms and values, and the outer conduct.
3. From a sober relationship with the nation: distanced, critical, self-conscious, independent, like children who have ultimately separated themselves from their parents, and have grown into adults.

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