LIVING WITH THE BOMB
AMERICAN AND JAPANESE CULTURAL CONFLICTS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

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EDITORS
LIVING WITH THE BOMB
Japan in the Modern World

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For Vinca and Cora, with love.

L.H.

And for hibakusha and civilian bomb victims everywhere.
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All Japanese names, with the exception of the author Sadao Asada, are given in Japanese order, family name before personal name, except where citing a work previously published using Western name order convention. Japanese-American names are given in Western name order.
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Introduction
Commemoration, Censorship, Conflict

For more than half a century, the world’s peoples have lived with the bomb: in awe of its power, anxious about its destructiveness, and aware that it was used to kill twice and could be used again, perhaps against oneself next time. This knowledge is most vivid, and has been most fiercely debated, in the United States and Japan. Both Americans and Japanese have revisited this issue repeatedly and reinterpreted it through the prism of the intervening half-century. That fifty-year history, including the shifts in United States–Japan relations, rather than the events of August 1945, is the subject of this book.

In both the United States and Japan, an “official story” quickly emerged to shape, but never to monopolize, nuclear consciousness. In each nation, a rich and distinctive body of literary, graphic, and historical work has engaged, documented, commemorated, protested, or mourned the bomb. From the earliest reports of the atomic bombings, Americans have viewed nuclear destruction primarily from the Promethean perspective of the inventor and bombardier. The carefully crafted image of a mushroom cloud spiraling heavenward has represented to most Americans the bomb as the ultimate symbol of victory in a “Good War” that carried the United States to the peak of its power and prosperity. This simple story presented Americans as a brave, selfless, and united people who responded to treachery with total
mobilization culminating in a knockout victory. In that narrative, which elides earlier decades of conflict between two rising colonial powers in Asia, retribution was devoid of desire for power or economic gain. The atomic bomb, and the decision to use it twice against urban populations, has been consistently portrayed in the official story as the shining example of American decisiveness, moral certitude, and technological ingenuity in the service of the nation. When the war is remembered as climaxing in the atomic bombs, these are the qualities being celebrated. Beginning in 1945, United States officials prevented wide distribution of most images of the bombs’ destruction, particularly of the human havoc it wrought, and suppressed information about radiation, its most terrifying effect. As the “American century” opened, exclusive possession of the bomb instilled confidence in the global deployment of American military power and dramatized the awesome responsibility contingent on possession of such destructive might.

By contrast, from the outset, the official Japanese perspective was from the position of the first, and thus far only, target population. Their focus was on the human victims in the hellfires that consumed Hiroshima, killing 140,000 of its 350,000 inhabitants, and then Nagasaki and 70,000 of the 270,000 people who lived there. The empathy of their compatriots came easily, since nearly all urban Japanese had endured the firebombing that had taken a toll of hundreds of thousands of lives and left all but two Japanese cities in ruins. In the official narrative, the bomb conjured images of death and fortitude amid destruction. It soon became the symbol of both national defeat by a cruel and powerful foe and stoic endurance.

Two documents were critical in defining the official story of the bomb for Americans. Both were carefully crafted justifications for its use on the populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One was also the first news most Americans had that such a weapon existed: President Harry Truman’s official announcement, in the form of a 1,160-word press release, that the United States had dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Truman solemnly warned the world of the bomb’s unparalleled might: “It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe.”

From the opening sentence, Truman’s announcement was designed to fend off criticism by describing Hiroshima as “an important Japanese army base.” This was technically true, but the military base on the outskirts of the city was not the bomb’s target. Nor was the main target an industrial site. Rather, the bombardiers were instructed to look for a distinctive bridge in the center of the city. They also had primed the bomb to
explode in the air, in order to maximize damage. Their mission was to annihilate the population and destroy the city in a terrifying demonstration of U.S. power.

The principal justification Truman gave for the bomb was vengeance: "The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid many fold." He said much less about inducing surrender and nothing at all about saving American lives. Hiroshima was forever after paired with Pearl Harbor in an official story of innocent victimization and righteous revenge. By treating the bomb as the necessary and appropriate response to Pearl Harbor and subsequent Japanese atrocities, this official narrative erases all the small and large American acts of revenge that went before: mutilation of Japanese war dead, the "take no prisoners" philosophy that frequently prevailed among U.S. forces in the final battles of the war, and especially the systematic bombing of Japan's civilian population. Although most of the major combatants, including the Japanese, bombed cities over the course of the war, in the end Americans far outdid all others in aerial destruction, setting a standard that would only be surpassed by U.S. bombardment of Vietnam twenty-five years later.4

The second highly influential document that shaped the official story and silenced critics was the 1947 Harper's magazine article by Henry Stimson, secretary of war from July 1940 to September 1945. Stimson added several key elements of the official line when he argued that that Japanese surrender had been elusive until the United States "administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the empire." The only credible alternative, he held, had been an invasion that might have "cost over a million casualties in American forces alone," with additional Allied losses and many more enemy casualties.5 This was the original statement—that is, the invention—of the 1 million casualty figure that would provide the centerpiece for subsequent defenses of the use of the atomic bombs.

Because Japan was a defeated and occupied nation, its framing of an official story of the atomic bomb and war's end was necessarily muted and indirect. Nevertheless, the emperor's Imperial Rescript announcing surrender on August 14, 1945, set the outlines of a Japanese official story. This radio broadcast, the emperor's first direct address to the Japanese people, emphasized the inhumanity of the Americans, the unity of "the entire nation ... as one family," and the role of the emperor himself as peacemaker, architect of the postwar Japanese state, and purveyor of progress.6

The Japanese official story about the bomb complemented the American one in several important ways. It, too, emphasized the awesome power of
the bombs and their unparalleled might. It also stated that atomic bombs were an important cause of the surrender. The devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided an opportunity for the emperor’s advisers to solve their most pressing problem: how to save the emperor system and end the war at the same time. The bombings allowed them to begin reshaping the image of the emperor as an advocate of both peace and science, since the surrender was issued in his name. The emperor announced the agreement to end the war, now that “the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives.” The emperor also used the occasion to exhort his subjects to “work with resolution so as ye may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial state and keep pace with the progress of the world.” The bomb and the emperor formed a pair. The elements of the emperor’s rehabilitation in postwar Japan—his association with peace, democracy, science, and a residual sense of cosmic awe—all echoed the concurrent American associations with the atomic bomb. The American and the Japanese official stories have collaborated to recast these two agents of destruction as peacemakers ever since 1945.

Japanese officials also paired Hiroshima with Pearl Harbor, but with a slightly different goal than the one Truman had in mind. Rather than using the parallel to justify harsh reprisal, they used it to suggest that Japanese aims in going to war were in no way aggressive. “We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to assure Japan’s self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement.” This would become a major defense argument at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Attorneys there argued that Japan had acted in self-defense and the United States had been the aggressor both in its demands that Japan withdraw from China and in its fortification of Pearl Harbor. Near the end of the war, the Japanese leaders were very concerned about protecting themselves and the emperor from indictment as war criminals, as had happened to Kaiser Wilhelm II after the First World War. The Imperial Rescript both argued that Japan had legitimate defensive reasons for going to war and asserted that the emperor had the unique authority to maintain peace and stability in a postsurrender Japan.

The rescript brilliantly anticipated and preempted charges of war crimes by claiming that, because of its greater technological power, the United States had engaged in a larger atrocity than anything Japan could muster. The emperor suggested this when he told the Japanese people that further resistance in the face of the atomic bomb could bring not only the “oblitera-
tion of the Japanese nation, but also ... the total extinction of human civilization.” Kiyose Ichiro of the wartime Greater Japan Political Association (and later defense counsel at the Tokyo Tribunal) said as much in the Asahi Shinbun on August 14, 1945, on the eve of Japan’s surrender. Pondering the fact that so inhuman a bomb had not been used against “white” Germany, he argued that the Americans must have deliberately reserved the atomic bomb for the Japanese, whom, he stated, they regarded as a lower race akin to monkeys. He concluded that vengeful racial prejudice lay behind its use.9

Nuclear debate in the United States and Japan over the subsequent half-century would directly or indirectly engage the premises of each nation’s official story. Both of these dominant narratives were established early, and both quickly came to define the two national officially sanctioned “etiquettes” of bomb discourse, to use Lane Fenrich’s term. In the United States, this etiquette required depersonalizing the victims (the view from the mushroom cloud rather than from the streets of the cities in flames), recalling Americans who died earlier in the war, framing the issues of the decision to bomb in terms almost exclusively of preventing the loss of American life, and suppressing inquiry into the relationship between the use of the bombs and subsequent Soviet-American conflict. In Japan, “etiquette” required treating the atomic bombings as uniquely traumatizing events isolated from discussion of Japan’s own aggressive colonialism and the war responsibility of the emperor. In other words, American commemorations of the bombings leave out Japanese victims, whereas Japanese ones leave out the victims of Japanese aggression. The Americans falsified the arithmetic of suffering and loss by silencing the voices of hibakusha (atomic bomb victims), while the Japanese silence on the larger issues of war preserved the image of a virtuous nation of innocent victims.

Nonetheless, despite the efforts of censors and other guardians of orthodox patriotism, the fabric of these official stories would rip and tear over the years. In both countries, the cold instrumentality of the official story fared badly against a broad humanist vision. Beginning just after the first reports of the bomb’s use, a number of American critics—notably scientists, political activists, and religious leaders, but also leading generals and politicians—expressed horror at the slaughter of civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and queried whether, in battling the ruthless Axis powers, Americans had come to resemble them. The broad popular response to John Hersey’s evocation of the lives of six Hiroshima residents as early as 1946 showed that such questions and doubts spread far beyond rarefied policy-making circles. In the writings of Hersey, Norman Cousins, Robert Lifton, John Dower, and many others over half a century, the human face of the
bomb’s victims has been repeatedly invoked against the official U.S. story. Others have questioned the oft-repeated assertion that the atomic bombings were necessary to end the war quickly. The bomb also evoked deep fears of annihilation, strengthened by subsequent nuclear proliferation, the arms race, and Soviet-American and Chinese-American conflict. Indeed, it is precisely this unsettling juxtaposition of celebration and critique that made so intense the American cultural-political battle fought over the heritage of the bomb on the fiftieth anniversary, particularly in the 1995 debate over the eviscerated exhibit on the bombings at the Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution.

For Japanese, if defeat and occupation were bitter, peace nevertheless held the promise of a better life for a nation in ruins. The atomic bombings marked the end of a conflict that had taken 3 million Japanese lives. Japan’s leveled cities—above all, Hiroshima and Nagasaki—symbolized the great sacrifices demanded by the wartime leaders as well as the technological achievements of the democratic foe. Many Japanese drew from the bombings the lesson that their own society needed to change and that postwar Japan had to become democratic, pacifist, technologically adept, and above all, humane.

Japanese writers, artists, and critics have repeatedly used the bomb as a vehicle for questioning not only Japanese colonialism, aggression, and atrocities but also the postwar Japanese political system, including rearmament, within the United States–Japan security relationship. The most sustained and influential such effort has been the succession of mural paintings by the artists Maruki Iri and Maruki Toshi that memorably link the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the slaughter by Japanese military forces in the Nanjing massacre and also by the Nazis at Auschwitz. The poet Kurihara Sadako, herself a hibakusha, made the link explicit in a 1974 poem, which began with the question, “When we say ‘Hiroshima,’ do people answer, gently, ‘Ah, Hiroshima’?” She instead heard the chorus from Nanjing, Manila, and other “echoes of blood and fire” and sadly concluded that before she could get the response “Ah, Hiroshima,” “we need first to cleanse our own filthy hands.” As Ellen Hammond observes, the same tensions over assessing Japanese colonialism and the war reappeared in the 1990s at the heart of the Japanese debate over the construction of a War Dead Peace Memorial Hall.

These Japanese and American controversies show that, rather than diminishing with time, memories of the war and bombings remain extraordinarily vivid and politically divisive at century’s end. If anything, tensions both within the United States and Japan and between the two nations have intensified over time. Postwar international experiences—the rise and de-
cline of American hegemony, Japan's political and economic isolation from and later reintegration into Asia, along with its rise as an economic superpower and challenger to the United States—have shaped subsequent discussion of the bomb, as have demands for greater racial, ethnic, and gender equity in both countries.

Remembrance and commemoration of the atomic bomb have been extraordinarily politicized subjects since its use in World War II. The symbolic world of commemoration is by no means a free market of ideas. The creation of official stories always involves processes of suppression of some stories and elevation of others. We characterize that process as the creation of silences. Historical silences take many forms. Outright censorship, insistence on lies, misrepresentation of others, refusal to listen, and defining a single representative national experience while disparaging other experiences as marginal or deviant are all acts of silencing. The act of commemoration may be a claim to a right to speak or to silence others. Some feel compelled to censor themselves. This book is littered with different kinds of historical silences, including state censorship and self-censorship in both Japan and the United States. Monica Braw has documented both the censorship imposed on publishing about the bomb in Japan by the 8,734 staff members of the U.S. occupation's censorship organ and the social stigma that imposed silence on the hibakusha after the occupation ended.14 George Roeder, building on earlier work on U.S. wartime censorship, shows how visual censorship in both Japan and the United States has denied access to the most powerful images of human suffering inflicted by the war, including the bomb.15

Memorials and museum exhibits are important sites of silencing and speaking, as many scholars have observed recently.16 (So are laws, textbooks, and pronouncements by presidents, prime ministers, and other national leaders.) World War II memorials elevate certain parts of the war story in both countries, particularly victories and the sacrifice of the nation's soldiers, and ignore others, such as the nature and number of military and civilian casualties—including those associated with the atomic bombs. In Japan, rightist vigilantes threaten violence to peace museums that try to speak to Japanese wartime aggression or the responsibility of the emperor, as in an exhibit planned for Nagasaki in 1996.17 This is the crudest sense in which control over commemoration and remembrance is an act of power. But silencing and suppression also occur in more subtle ways in both countries.

The debate about the bomb ranges from the big issues of war to the enduring problems of peace. When either Americans or Japanese talk about the bombings, they are thinking about the meaning of World War II, of
This view of Nagasaki in ruins was one of the very few images of the atomic aftermath available to Japanese in 1945 and, indeed, throughout the occupation years. It appeared in the Asahi Shinbun on August 25, 1945. Such a scene, of city and nature destroyed and Japanese people carrying on, could have been taken in nearly any Japanese city in August 1945. The Japanese press did not publish, in the month before occupation censorship forbade it, images that conveyed the vast toll of human life. Nor did the national newspapers do so after the occupation ended, although regional newspapers and magazines did. (Photograph by Yamahata Yosuke, early morning, August 10, 1945. From Ienaga Saburo and Odagiri Hideo, Hiroshima Nagasaki Genbaku Shashin-kaiga Shusei (Hiroshima and Nagasaki: the atomic bombings as seen through photographs and artwork) (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Senta, 1993) 6 volume set, 1.172. Henceforth Ienaga.

subsequent wars, and of prospective conflicts. They are also posing questions of the relationship of citizens to their own state, the meaning of democratic participation, and the state’s prerogatives to make war. In both Japan and the United States, discussion of the bombings has always resonated with visions of the future as well as judgments about the past.

In the end, the official stories are wholly inadequate to capture the lived experience of all the people of either nation or to grasp the ongoing global significance of the dawning nuclear era. The Japanese case has always been more complex, both because of the overlapping authority of American and Japanese government censors during the occupation and also because Japanese politics has long been dominated by American security policy, including its “nuclear umbrella.” But many Americans also feel disenfranchised
by the bomb orthodoxy. Some, such as Sodei Rinjiro’s Japanese-American atomic bomb victims, have difficulty finding a place for themselves within either nation’s official story. His title “Were We the Enemy?” highlights their dilemma whether read from the perspective of Japan or the United States. Neither the American government’s adamantine defense of the bombings nor the Japanese criticism of them as “contrary to civilization and humanity” can capture what Jay Winter has called “the vigorous and stub­bornly visible incompatibilities” of history.18 This volume explores various forms of commemoration and silencing, as well as conflicts that occurred as Americans and Japanese have grappled with problems of living with the bomb.

The Bomb as Emblem of American Justice and Japanese Innocence

Much of the bomb’s specific cultural resonance is with national narratives of the war that define patriotism, power, and honor. In the United States, the most sensitive aspect of the 1995 atomic debate centered on implications that Americans were other than kind, generous, decent, and honorable in all aspects of the war. The conflict over the Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian was touched off when critics denounced the exhibit for casting doubts on these premises. The Pacific War, culminating in the atomic bombings, has most often been remembered as a victory for American civilization over Japanese barbarism, unlike the political battle against European fascists. As John Dower has observed, this way of looking at the conflict dates back to wartime propaganda, which highlighted the innate treachery and inhuman­ity of the Japanese far more than their undemocratic political system or colonial oppression.19 Portraying Japanese as vicious and even subhuman is subsidiary (but indispensable) to this scenario, which emphasized the virtues of American culture.

American use of the bomb has been associated in official statements since Truman’s announcement with reasoned and judicious capital punish­ment. That image is also preserved to this day in popular attitudes about potential future deployment of atomic weapons. Hugh Gusterson notes that the nuclear scientists at Livermore Laboratories are committed to the idea that anger is dangerous and inappropriate for those who control nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Gusterson argues, peace protesters challenge the scientists on precisely this point, believing that repression of anger at the production and use of nuclear weapons is far more dangerous. The protest­ers challenge the claims both to rationality and to justice made for the American nuclear program.

Since 1945, in Japan, the bombs’ victims have stood for the wartime
suffering of all Japanese. However, this focus is the single point of congruence for several very different Japanese positions on issues of war, peace, and Japan's global role. Although Japanese who were not at Hiroshima or Nagasaki in August 1945 readily see themselves as part of the "imagined community" of victims of the atomic bomb, it is far less common for postwar Japanese to identify either with their forces rampaging across the Asian continent or with the Asian victims of Japanese colonialism. One reason why the simple human tragedy of the bombed emerges so powerfully in Japanese consciousness is that it is among the few aspects of the war on which all Japanese can agree.

Japanese nationalists have focused on the suffering of the bomb's Japanese victims in part to obscure Japan's aggressive war and the predatory character of the empire. In their invocation, the bombings veil Japanese wartime atrocities, including the Nanjing massacre (and many smaller ones throughout China and Asia), the conscription and cruel treatment of military sex slaves ("comfort women"), brutality toward both POWs and civilian conscripted labor in the empire, and the chemical and biological human experiments of Unit 731. The second major elision in the official Japanese story is the repressive nature of prewar society itself. When Japan's leaders evaded inquiry into specific responsibility for war crimes, they did so by displacing blame onto the Japanese people as a whole. They, too, blurred the line between military perpetrators and civilian targets at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in order to draw attention away from similar distinctions in other battles.

The atomic blasts have never been an easy subject for Japanese nationalists, however. Emphasis on the immense power of atomic weaponry underlines wartime Japan's technical inferiority and thus the stupidity of Japan's leaders in provoking war. Here the contrast with Nazi Germany is fruitful. Where postwar German leaders could simply distance themselves from the Nazi era, the continued political role of the emperor and of many other prewar officials precluded such options for Japanese leaders. At the same time, because Japan was defeated and its wartime military elite and colonial pretensions discredited (with the important exception of the emperor), two powerful and contradictory Japanese narratives of the war and the Japanese wartime state have been sustained since 1945: nationalist celebration and pacifist critique.

Thus, while memories of wartime privation and suffering have served as a basis for nationalist celebration of the unique "Japanese spirit," they also have been the main rallying cry for humanist antinuclear and antimilitary movements. Memories of those bleak years still provide the most powerful imagery for the deep-rooted pacifism that runs through postwar Japanese consciousness and politics. Japan's antinuclear movement has long been linked to international visions of a peaceful future that found powerful resonance and
Residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki spent the first weeks after the bombings frantically searching for family members. This notice, lying in the ruins of a large china shop in Hiroshima, records the fate of one family and the attempts of surviving members to contact others in a city with no telephones, no mail service, and almost no recognizable landmarks. It informs the reader that Tsunoda Hatsugoro is dead. Tsunoda Juichi (38), Tsunoda Denzaburo (30), Tsunoda Fusayo (58), Tsunoda Fumie (27), Tsunoda Midori (21) are all missing. Tsunoda Fusako and Tsunoda Tadashi are at an address in Itsukaichi town. (Photograph by Hayashi Shigeo. No date. Ienaga, 1.36.)

legitimation in the no-war clause (Article 9) of the postwar Constitution.

Official narratives about the bomb as the final act of the war have only imperfectly captured and commemorated visions of wartime American justice and Japanese innocence. Both have been repeatedly disrupted by historical attention to the conduct of the war. Yet divisive as those issues of wartime behavior overseas have been in both countries, issues of democracy at home have been even more explosive. The most enduring battles over the bomb in both the United States and Japan have been about citizenship and postwar political power.

The Bomb as Enforcer of Postwar Orthodoxies

The insistence on American moral purity in official commemoration of the bombings and the end of the war has had enormous domestic as well as
international implications. Every American president from Harry Truman to Bill Clinton has publicly rejected the idea that there could be any moral ambiguity regarding the killing of the civilian populations in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, still less an obligation to apologize for that act. This certainty is hard to sustain in light of the devastation and loss of civilian life caused by the two nuclear bombs. Military critics of the Smithsonian exhibit on the fiftieth anniversary of the bomb showed their awareness of that fact when, mindful of the moral weight of a child’s charred lunch box set off against the gleaming superfortress bomber, they would accept nothing short of total victory (however Pyrrhic): in the end, the lunch box and other personal artifacts, as well as any doubts about the necessity of dropping the bombs on civilians, were eliminated from the exhibit, and the B–29 Enola Gay fuselage was displayed nearly alone and with virtually no explanation of the event. The military critique could not tolerate the presentation of any evidence of the destructive impact of the bomb on city and society. Here again, commemoration required extensive censorship.

The vigilance of the military critics sprang from the fundamental assumption that the war represented two national cultures in conflict. If American culture won the war and safeguards the peace, then criticisms of that culture today—or of the memory of World War II—are not just alarming but directly jeopardize national defense. This assumption lay behind the emotional reaction to the Enola Gay exhibit by proponents of orthodox patriotism and the extraordinary level of vitriol hurled at the exhibit designers. Michael Sherry traces those anxieties back to the war itself, locating their social roots in “a lasting interaction between national security and social change” extending to profound shifts in gender and race relations. And as Sherry argues in this volume, this quest for moral purity has both mutated into one for cultural and ideological purity and turned inward to attack other Americans who are perceived as polluters of pristine American life.

The presentation of the bomb in state mythology as a symbol of American moral unity ushered in a world in which many Americans were driven to the margins of citizenship. Those marginalized included racial and religious minorities and gays, a theme to which we return below, as well as political dissenters, Americans whose political ideals were deemed too dangerous to tolerate in the postwar nuclear world. The postwar search for atom bomb spies went public as early as 1948, when the House Un-American Activities Committee charged the scientists at the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory with harboring Soviet spies. But the search for disloyal citizens fanned across the nation, until at least 13.5 million Americans underwent
investigation in the course of applying for jobs. One agent working out of Chicago calculated that the only place big enough to put all the local suspects the FBI planned to arrest in a crisis was the football stadium, Soldiers’ Field. People were investigated as security risks for inter-racial friendships and homosexuality as well as more overtly political stances, such as a history of support for republican Spain or protest against nuclear testing. That postwar world was the one created by the bomb, not by the war against fascism. Indeed, in the era of anticommunist witch hunts, adherence to the political ideals of the war era had become grounds for investigation as a subversive. Outspoken commitment to antifascism, anticolonialism, democratic expression, the contributions of a diverse citizenry, and internationalism all became emblems of dissent rather than of a healthy democracy. In that climate, memories of the war against barbaric Japan resonated far better with daily life than did those of the antifascist and anti-imperialist war against Germany and Italy. Moreover, as Yui Daizaburo notes in his essay in this volume, that memory of World War II as a cultural war, rather than a fight between democrats and despots, has been far more appealing to postwar Japanese nationalists as well.

The emphasis on the bomb also dimmed memories of the contributions and sacrifices of America’s allies, notably those of the Soviet Union. If the atomic bombs ended the war, then the Soviets contributed nothing to victory in the Pacific. Most Japanese historians argue that the Soviet entry into the Pacific War, together with the atomic bombs, was critical to Japan’s surrender. By August 15, the Soviets had routed Japan’s Kwantung army in Manchuria. The presentation of the bomb as a superweapon with the capacity to assure total victory without a single U.S. casualty minimizes the extent to which the war was conducted—and its outcome determined—the old-fashioned way, through long, grueling years of conflict that took between 50 million and 80 million lives globally, including 3 million Japanese and 300,000 Americans.

The bomb and the threat of future atomic warfare have been a source of great anxiety or, as Saito Michio has put it, “the ghost that haunts Americans.” In contrast to the intensely specific and personal quality of Japanese discussions of the bomb, both celebratory and critical American discussions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki often have been simultaneously anxiety-ridden and oddly vague and abstract. That abstraction went hand in hand with the tradition of ignoring the historical Japanese men and women who actually experienced nuclear warfare, and as Lane Fenrich shows, it stretches back to 1945. Americans often have expressed the effects of the bomb in terms such as “man’s inhumanity to man” or have repopulated the landscape of death with imaginary American victims. As Norman Cousins,
an early critic of the bombs, put it, the bomb raised "the fear of irrational death . . . filling the mind with primordial apprehensions," effectively removing the bomb from historical time altogether. Americans have imagined themselves in the roles of perpetrator and of victim, but typically in ways that erase Japanese suffering, indeed any sense of the actual impact of real bombs that were dropped on living people in a specific historical moment. The chapters by Michael Sherry, Lane Fenrich, George Roeder, Hugh Gusterson, John Dower, and Laura Hein explore diverse expressions of that American imagination.

Japanese have also deployed memories of the bomb to settle postwar political disputes at home. Although the bomb has been a problematic symbol for Japanese defenders of the presurrender system, it also has been hard to control by their critics, even though they often have evoked the suffering of the hibakusha to highlight the tragic consequences of Japanese dreams of conquest. There has always been a tension between those who use the bomb to invoke international disarmament and those who use it to highlight Japan's own war responsibility. The antibomb activists' pacifist vision—because it is addressed to all the participants in World War II, victor and vanquished alike—transcends the issue of responsibility of particular nations, societies, or individuals for the war. Moreover, Japanese critics of their war have also had to negotiate the fact that the atomic bombs may have contributed to Japan's surrender and, if so, liberated the nation not only from war but also from leaders who were prepared to sacrifice many more Japanese lives for a doomed cause.

The difficulties many Japanese experienced in reconciling the experience of the atomic bombings with criticisms of wartime society are epitomized in the personal testimony of Maruyama Masao, one of Japan's most influential voices for a democratic polity. Although Maruyama was in Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, as a young soldier, he did not refer to the bomb in his critique of presurrender Japanese fascism. Although not hiding his status as a hibakusha, he never discussed it publicly until 1969, when he expressed regret at his failure to draw on that experience in his thinking and writing. Maruyama was far more concerned about critiquing the institutional structures of presurrender Japan that had led to the war than about American responsibility for events at war's end.

Both Japanese nationalists and pacifists proclaim their patriotism—that is, they present alternative and quite incompatible visions for serving the best interests of the Japanese people. Jay Winter has described "two essential components of ceremonies commemorating war dead," but in Japan, each side has successfully appropriated only one of them. The government and closely affiliated groups such as the Association of Bereaved Families
have supplied “the public recognition, and mediation through ritual, of bereavement” for all the Japanese war dead, thereby implicitly or explicitly endorsing the cause for which they sacrificed, but have offered nothing that linked that sacrifice to the future. The antinuclear and peace movements have far more successfully laid claim to “the appeal to the living to remember the dead by dedicating themselves to good works among their fellow men and women.” Their commitment to world peace and disarmament is a powerful means to transform mass death into the warning epitomized in their slogan “No More Hiroshimas.” Their rituals of bereavement, however, seem to have offered less satisfaction in Japan, both because they remember the victims of atomic bombs as “first among equals” within the legion of Japanese war dead and because of the terrible factional fighting that has plagued the postwar peace movement.

The government’s inability to appropriate Winter’s second “essential component” was due in part to its support of the United States–Japan Security Treaty (Anpo) directed against the Soviets and the Chinese. The government has been dominated through most of the postwar era by a political party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), that both defends the postwar security alliance with the United States and houses some of Japan’s most ardent nationalists, an uneasy though enduring juxtaposition. In contrast, pacifists and antinuclear activists have opposed the military alliance on internationalist humanist grounds. Thus, Japan’s biggest postwar protest was against the 1960 revisions of the Security Treaty, which the LDP rammed through the Diet after most of the opposition members had been carried bodily from the building by police. In other words, antinuclear and antiwar protest in Japan has traditionally combined criticism of Japanese militarism before the surrender, U.S. military policy and Japanese complicity in it after that date, and Japanese democratic procedure at home. The most volatile example of antimilitary action in the mid-1990s is the Okinawan protest against both the presence of U.S. military bases and central Japanese government policy supporting them. The conflict is exacerbated by the long-standing official fiction maintained by both governments that nuclear weapons are neither stored at nor transported through the bases.

Japanese antinuclear activists have moved far in recent years to expand their scope from the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to all the victims of World War II, including non-Japanese, and all subsequent victims of nuclear power, such as those of Chernobyl. The LDP mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have distinguished themselves from the mainstream of their party by calling for reflection on Japanese actions during the war and the subsequent neglect of foreign hibakusha. They are part of an ongoing sea
change in Japanese historical memory about World War II in the 1990s. For example, in the 1990s, for the first time, a small number of former military sex slaves dared to speak publicly and to file suit against the Japanese government, which had organized and directed their enslavement. Groups within Japan, as well as support organizations in Korea, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, including the United Nations, championed their cause. The plight of the comfort women and other colonial subjects also has redirected attention to the callousness of the wartime Japanese state toward its own citizens. This is one reason why demands for redress, pressed vigorously by many groups in the context of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war, have revived issues of militarism, war, the empire, and the emperor in such volatile ways. Yui and Hammond are pessimistic about the prospects for change in the near future, citing the lack of support within the government for either apology or restitution to wartime victims. But the scope of the debate over war responsibility at a time of turmoil in Japanese politics in the mid-1990s may be a harbinger of change. Perhaps the hibakusha will soon be able to mourn their own dead, no longer troubled by unacknowledged ghosts all around them.

In recent years, the atomic bomb may also have lost some of its symbolic power to give credence to the official Japanese narrative of wartime and postwar history, unlike the American version. As Korean-Japanese hibakusha and others stake their claims to the story, the subtext of racial unity through suffering has weakened. Moreover, as Japanese such as Nobel laureate Oe Kenzaburo and comic book artist Nakazawa Keiji reframe the atomic horror as part of the greater horror perpetrated by Japan’s military leaders on their compatriots and the rest of Asia, the bomb works less and less well as an emblem of a united Japan persecuted by the West. Perhaps this is why, in the 1980s, the government censored from textbooks both graphics depicting the atomic bombings and references to Japanese aggression in Asia. Rather, as Ellen Hammond notes, right-wing nationalists now talk about the war and postwar Allied occupation as one unbroken era, hoping to overlay Japanese memories of wartime coercion by Japanese leaders in the early 1940s with memories of the foreign occupiers later in the decade. Finally, in contemporary Japan, perhaps the most technologically sophisticated place on earth, the narrative of capitulation to overwhelming American technological might no longer compels many Japanese.

Silencing History

Both Americans and Japanese now view the bombings through the filters of fifty years of history. This includes all the postwar interactions between
Japanese and Americans, some of which pertain directly to the bombings themselves. Much of the controversy today over the meaning of those acts is over which aspects of subsequent history are appropriately recognized and which resolutely ignored. As argued above, for Americans, this meant recurring battles over the morality and common sense of American foreign policy.\textsuperscript{35} For Japanese, recognition of the nation’s wartime depredations in Asia was more controversial. In both countries, the experience of the Vietnam War engendered new levels of criticism, which washed back in time to suffuse perceptions of the bombings. Likewise, in both nations, changes in race and gender relations required citizens of Japan and the United States alike to look back at the 1940s with a new perspective on their own history. Often silenced in the process is any critical recognition of the historical distance between midcentury and century’s end in each nation.

One way in which history has been silenced is through the official manipulation of the story of the decision to drop the bombs. We now know that bomb memories have been officially constructed in a remarkably consistent way within each country for fifty years. The research of Monica Braw, Barton Bernstein, and James Hershberg has revealed U.S. officials’ preoccupation in the late 1940s with combating negative Japanese and American reactions to the use of atomic bombs. Not only did they suppress unfavorable publicity and maintain a U.S. monopoly on nuclear research, they also deliberately published false information and disinformation as a means to defend the moral legitimacy of the U.S. decision to use the bomb. The calculated inflation of the projected American death toll in a land invasion of Japan is the best-documented, but not the only, example of deception.\textsuperscript{36}

It is no coincidence that the final collapse of negotiations over the \textit{Enola Gay} exhibit occurred when the curators were forced to deal with the discrepancy between official casualty projections, published following the surrender, and the far lower unpublished ones that military planners used before the surrender. Critics of the exhibit, fearful that lower U.S. casualty figures would undermine the official case for using the bombs, cried “revisionism” to undermine the authority of those who returned to primary sources to challenge official mythologies. The exposure of the history of the invention of “better” numbers undercuts the credibility of government, making official spokespersons seem deceitful, politically motivated, and deeply cynical in their treatment of Americans as well as other people.

The slowly emerging story of the many times when the U.S. government considered using atomic weapons against other populations, notably during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, is another important example of suppression of information. If nuclear strikes had occurred, the planes would almost
certainly have left from American military bases in Japan or Okinawa. Many years after retiring as ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer revealed that it was standard procedure then and since for American nuclear-armed submarines to enter Japanese and Okinawan ports and that the Japanese government was aware of this. His revelation directly contradicted decades of official Japanese government pronouncements.

Censorship does not silence only the powerless, the disorganized, the inarticulate, and the hibakusha. As Michael Sherry and John Dower observe, its victims also include ranking military leaders, such as General George Marshall and Admiral William Leahy, and atomic scientists, such as Leo Szilard and James Franck, who all argued against dropping bombs on civilians. Leahy, for example, subsequently compared the bomb to banned weapons such as poison gas: "It is not a bomb. It is not an explosive. It is a poisonous thing that kills people by its deadly radioactive reaction." His opinion, long available in published form, together with all other traces of doubt and dissent, were banished from the Smithsonian exhibit fifty years later.

Postwar American foreign policy, especially nuclear policy, often has affected Japanese public opinion in powerful ways. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and U.S. testing of the hydrogen bomb at Bikini in 1954 combined to intensify Japanese anxiety about nuclear holocaust. When twenty-three crew members of the Lucky Dragon tuna boat were contaminated with radiation from the blast, responses included a petition campaign calling for a ban on nuclear weapons that collected 30 million signatures and the convening in Hiroshima of the 1955 World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. Suddenly, to many Japanese, nuclear destruction seemed a distinct possibility in the future rather than just an event in the past. That heightening of nuclear fears helps explain why hibakusha organizations, which joined in the Japan Confederation of A-Bomb and H-Bomb Sufferers Organization (Hidankyo) in 1957, were able to secure for the first time a Japanese government commitment to pay for their medical treatment. Once again, this peace activity embodied a criticism of Japanese official acceptance of the U.S. Security Treaty as much as of the United States.

The Vietnam War was probably the single most important event in reshaping American attitudes toward World War II and the bomb. That costly conflict undermined American moral certainty and cast doubt on the judgment of American military leaders while eroding American economic and military power and credibility. Then, as in 1945 and 1995, the bomb was invoked to reassert American superiority. In 1976, one year after the United States completed its withdrawal from Vietnam, a group calling itself the
Confederate Air Force, whose ostensible mission was to restore World War II aircraft, attacked Hiroshima in simulations staged throughout the United States. *Enola Gay* pilot Paul Tibbets returned to the controls of a B–29 and taught spectators that “the phoenix of future victory” had risen from the ashes of Pearl Harbor and that the atomic bomb overcame “some of the darkest days of America’s history.” The re-enactment of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima had far less to do with contemporary American perceptions of Japan than with an attempt to restitch the mantle of patriotism that had been tattered by the long battle in Vietnam.

In other words, the emphasis on the “Good War” in the United States over the last twenty-five years was in part an attempt to erase political disunity about Vietnam from national memory. President George Bush admitted as much in 1990 when he proclaimed that the Persian Gulf War would “not be another Vietnam War,” a reference not to the destructiveness of the war but to the speed with which he guaranteed victory. When the pilot of the *Enola Gay* trailed off at the end of his 1995 wish that “If people could see the attitude we had, the great sense of patriotism, the sincerity of our beliefs . . .,” he was acknowledging the cultural distance between his generation and younger people influenced by the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal.

The Vietnam War has had a powerful effect on Japanese thinking about World War II and the atomic bombings as well. Japan and Okinawa provided major staging areas for the American military with the full cooperation of the Japanese government. The war had little support among the Japanese population, many of whom saw it as an example of both American racism against Asians and Japanese willingness to devastate another Asian nation, albeit this time in a role subordinate to the United States. Sadao Asada shows that American conduct in the Vietnam War disposed many more Japanese to assume that racism was a major factor in the decision to drop the bombs twenty years earlier. One of the most influential Japanese journalists to cover the Vietnam War, Honda Katsuichi, expressed both a sense of pan-Asian identity with the Vietnamese in his criticism of American actions there and a sharp critique of Japanese wartime militarism, when he argued that except for Okinawans, Japanese, even those who lived through the atomic bombings, could not fully understand the experience or the determination of the Vietnamese.

In another kind of example, focused on the subsequent commemoration of the two wars, the Vietnam memorial in Washington, D.C.—and the controversy over building it—inspired the Okinawa memorial, erected in 1995 by the prefectural government. The builders of the Okinawa memorial drew on the example of America’s Vietnam memorial but extended the
theme of commemoration one step further by listing the names of all combatants who died there on both sides of the struggle. The city of Naha, a cosponsor of the memorial, invited U.S. veterans' groups to put up a plaque but rejected their initial proposal because they thought it glorified the war. The Okinawan commemoration of the war dead explicitly rejected nationalism by expressing reverence for the human carnage of war on all sides. It is hard to imagine such a government-sponsored monument either in the United States or anywhere else in Japan. The Okinawan monument both undercuts American and Japanese nationalist commemorations of that battle and stakes out a space for an independent Okinawan consciousness, a position that was strengthened by the protest in 1995 and 1996 against the U.S. military bases following the rape of a twelve-year-old Okinawan girl by three G.I.s. Like the Korean-Japanese, whose monument to Korean hibakusha has provided a rallying point for criticism of Japanese discrimination today, as described by Lisa Yoneyama, the Okinawans offer a critique of contemporary Japanese politics and their marginalized place in society through their analysis of the war and its aftermath.

Critics of Japanese militarism and colonialism also have sometimes drawn inspiration from postwar American re-evaluations of their own wartime practices, particularly over the complex issue of apology and restitution. For example, the Bush administration's apology and financial restitution to Japanese-Americans who had been interned during the war encouraged Koreans and Chinese who had been forced to labor as soldiers, guards, miners, factory workers, or sexual slaves to demand reparations and an apology from the Japanese government for its wartime actions. The official American recognition of its own injustice toward its citizens, and its willingness to provide financial restitution, undercut official Japanese assertions that all the major combatants behaved alike during World War II and have justified their behavior in the same ways ever since.

Nonetheless, the atomic bombs are connected to issues of Japanese and American remorse and apology in complex ways, as the example of redress for Japanese-Americans suggests. The two governments have also used each other's postwar pronouncements about World War II as excuses to avoid dealing with their own level of war responsibility. Yui provides an example of two-way United States–Japan interaction at the policy level in the 1995 proposed resolution to apologize for the war. This stalled in the Diet in part because of official U.S. reiteration of the value of the bombings and refusal to consider any form of apology. In turn, the Diet's failure to pass the resolution stiffened American antagonism toward Japan, rekindling discussion of Pearl Harbor and Bataan.
Norma Field has explored the tension inherent in any apology for barbarous behavior, whether or not accompanied by monetary restitution, through the debate over Japanese state responsibility for and recompense to the wartime comfort women. Because decades have passed since the war, mere words cannot provide adequate recompense for lifelong suffering, humiliation, and sorrow. Yet monetary recompense suggests that misery can be tallied in market terms and paid off as though it were merely a forgotten bill, devaluing the verbal apology. For the comfort women, sexual slaves of the wartime Japanese military, payment risks the added danger of shading their experience into a "normal" prostitution transaction. This tension is heightened by the fact that, for a prosperous Japan, restitution looks suspiciously like a debt of noblesse oblige rather than an act to alleviate guilt.48 Yet without significant restitution, however belated, such as German government payments to Jewish Holocaust survivors and United States and Canadian government payments to the residents of Japanese ancestry they had interned, the apology has a hollow ring. The passage of time imparts added urgency: soon neither money nor apology will offer solace as the remaining victims die. These issues are likely to remain at the heart of disagreements within as well as between the United States and Japan and between Japan and Asia for a long time.

History has been silenced in other ways as well. In both Japan and the United States, orthodox patriots along with the citizenry generally have become sensitive to criticisms that would not have disturbed their counterparts in 1945. Although most Americans preferred a Jim Crow army and few questioned internment all Japanese-Americans on the West Coast in the 1940s, racial integration of the military subsequently became widely accepted. Critics of the Enola Gay exhibit demanded that all references to segregated practices be deleted. They feared that the efforts of (white) American fighting forces would be devalued by attention to those policies. That fear was also revealed in their attacks on earlier re-examinations of Christopher Columbus, the American West, and the wartime internment of Japanese-Americans by other museums under the Smithsonian umbrella. Suppressing discussion of institutionalized racism of the 1940s and earlier is a response to sensibilities that developed slowly over the postwar era, not to attitudes of the war years themselves.

Similarly, in Japan, the existence of the comfort woman was not only common knowledge among millions of Japanese soldiers but was not kept secret from civilians either. The desperate lives of these women did not seem so exceptional to wartime Japanese. After all, the comfort women were only one step more miserable than the Japanese daughters who were indentured to brothels by their impoverished fathers. It is a mark of the
changes of the last fifty years in Japan that poorer communities no longer often include at least one family whose daughters are working off their father’s debt in a brothel. Immediately after the war, the former sexual slaves were stigmatized in their own countries as well as in Japan. The cruelty of their exploiters was ignored, and the survivors faced decades of contempt, isolation, and poverty. Only after feminists in Japan and Asia reconceptualized these attitudes as oppression of women and criticized contemporary activities such as sex tourism in Asia could the comfort women issue explode into public consciousness in Japan and internationally. This recent shift in acceptable social practice explains why the Japanese government in the 1990s tried to deny the role its officials played in procuring comfort women during the war and refused to pay reparations directly while simultaneously encouraging private groups to raise funds that might be considered unofficial recompense.

Finally, bomb “etiquette” suppresses the emotional distance that many Americans have traveled since August 1945. Paul Fussell has spoken for many veterans in insisting that only those who fought can appreciate the need to drop the bombs and they alone are entitled to assess the validity of the decision. But his argument also silences those veterans who have moved beyond their original reactions to the bomb. David Joravsky and Howard Zinn have each told similar stories of evolving attitudes, beginning with the emotion characterized by Fussell as “Thank God for the atomic bomb.” Like Fussell, both Joravsky, on a troop train in France, and Zinn, on furlough between assignments in the European and Pacific theaters, thought of the bomb first as deliverance from danger. But unlike Fussell, both later began to reflect on the ethics of the atomic era. For Joravsky and Zinn, as for many other Americans, veterans and civilians alike, the shock of reading John Hersey’s understated portraits of individual hibakusha led them toward a lifetime of sustained inquiry into the issues of morality, patriotism, and the bomb. That chain of thought based on empathy and imagination is the target of many defenders of the bombings, who attempt to break it by rejecting empathy as unscientific, by substituting alternate imaginary scenarios in which bombs fall on America, or by insisting that the Japanese were beyond the pale of human sympathy. The argument that any conduct is justifiable to secure American military victory thus silences all reflection based on the fifty-year experience of living with the bomb.

**Silencing Hibakusha**

Perhaps the ultimate act of silencing has been and continues to be the silencing of the voices of hibakusha themselves. This occurs in many forms,
a few self-imposed, most not. U.S. censorship and disinformation in the early post-surrender years included a concerted effort to minimize information about the human effects of the bomb in Japan, as detailed by Monica Braw in this volume and elsewhere. This included censorship of material that was freely available in the United States. John Hersey's *Hiroshima*, for example, was censored for three years before it could finally be published in translation in occupied Japan. Japanese authorities also censored information about the atomic bombings, probably because such images reflected badly on its ability and commitment to protect the people. And there were also more subtle ways in which the hibakusha experience was suppressed.

Yet the history of silencing includes examples of both enduring suppression and almost quixotic exceptions. Although most photographs of Hiroshima were censored during the occupation, the professional photographer Matsushige Yoshito was only mildly rebuked for 1946 publication of five photographs he had taken on August 6, 1945. Nagai Takashi's memoir *Nagasaki no Kane* (The Bells of Nagasaki) was eventually cleared for 1948 publication when the author accepted the censor's condition that it be published together with material provided by U.S. military intelligence on Japanese atrocities in the Philippines, thereby blatantly equating the U.S. atomic bombing of Japan with Japanese atrocities in Asia.

Not only did the censors occasionally allow publication of descriptions of the war and bombings, but the rules of censorship have sometimes changed precipitously. For example, U.S. government concerns about presenting graphic images of the war dead shifted radically in the fifty years since the war. During the debate over the Air and Space Museum exhibit, orthodox patriots complained that there were more photos of dead Japanese in the plans than there were of dead Americans. The critics charged that the curators were deliberately trying to create an image of the Japanese as passive victims of American aggression. Patriotism, they insisted, required emphasizing Americans' supreme sacrifice, not the loss of Japanese life.

This way of thinking about the presentation of U.S. and Japanese casualties reverses official instructions to the press during World War II. George Roeder notes that no U.S. publication ran pictures of dead American soldiers until military policy changed in September 1943. The military had become concerned that U.S. civilians were becoming complacent about the war effort. After that, images of soldiers killed in battle became more common. Still, scenes of mass carnage were routinely censored when the bodies were American, as were pictures of soldiers who died out of uniform. There was no hesitation about publishing photographs of Japanese war dead unless they showed evidence of Americans' treating the bodies with contempt. In other words, the presentation of more images of Japanese dead
than Americans and more dead per image—in scenes of mass death—was coded patriotic in 1944 but unpatriotic in 1994. In both cases, U.S. government policies set the tone.

The wartime Japanese government also carefully controlled information about casualties. Photographs, published descriptions of deaths, and even letters home from the front were censored during the war. Japanese officials restricted depictions of death both in battle and on the home front after U.S. firebombing raids. They also printed no photographs showing the devastation wrought by the atomic bombs in the final nine days of the war. Moreover, although the Japanese press denounced the inhumanity of the “new type” bomb, shortly to be identified as an atomic bomb, there were few photographs of the bombed areas and none that captured the human dimensions of the attack in the one to two months from the surrender until the U.S. censorship was firmly in place. The one newspaper that has pioneered information about atomic destruction is Hiroshima’s Chugoku Shinbun, which lost 113 of its 300 employees on August 6, 1945. The publishers, who also lost family on that day, have maintained a vigorous antinuclear and pacifist editorial policy ever since.\(^5^4\)

Nor did the postwar press emphasize the human devastation of the atomic bombs. The first photograph in a national paper revealing the devastation inflicted by the bomb appeared in the Asahi on August 19, four days after surrender. This shot panning Hiroshima showed one large factory chimney and a handful of building frames left standing while the city itself was a smoldering ruin, leveled as far as the eye could see. No human being was visible. On August 25, the paper printed two photos by Yamahata Yosuke. The first was of several people, some carrying children, walking through a background of devastation in Nagasaki. A second photograph showed several people in front of a deformed tree with smoke in the background. Neither depicted dead or badly wounded victims of the bomb. In the years following, even after the occupation ended, the press provided only a few other photos of the mushroom cloud, the atomic dome, and the bomb itself.

The first close-up photo of survivors in one of the “big three” newspapers appeared on August 6, 1965, the twentieth anniversary of the bombing, in a section in the Asahi captioned “Hiroshima Is Praying.” Photographs taken in 1965 showed two women hibakusha and a nurse in prayer, the mayor adding names to the cenotaph, citizens in the Peace Park at 8:15 A.M., and a blind hibakusha playing the violin. The most moving photo showed an elderly couple praying for their lost daughter, her photograph above them on the wall. Whether by government censorship or self-censorship, in the twenty years following the bomb, Japan’s leading newspapers published
not a single photograph that suggested the nature or magnitude of the inju-
ries, suffering, and deaths that the bombs inflicted on the people of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki.\textsuperscript{55} This was another kind of silence, one that extended
beyond the occupation. Although regional papers and magazines published
some records of the hibakusha experience, it was decades before the Japan-
esee people gained access to many of the most powerful visual images of the
destructive consequences of the atomic bomb. Atomic bomb literature,
much of it censored during the occupation, presented the experience and per-
spective of the hibakusha in print long before a comparable visual record was
released. Film footage shot in 1945 by a Japanese crew was censored by the
occupation forces, by the post-occupation U.S. government, by a Japanese film
company, and by the Japanese government and was not released until 1968 in
the United States and 1970 in Japan.\textsuperscript{56} American and Japanese authorities,
then, each for different reasons, hid from view the great toll of human lives
exacted by the bombs and the physical suffering of the survivors.

The immediate aftermath to the bombings, no less than subsequent mem-
ory wars, reflected relations of power locally, nationally, and globally. Such
relationships of power profoundly affected the context in which hibakusha
could speak of their experiences. Some chose to remain silent. As the three
essays on hibakusha gathered here show, many have hidden their experi-
ence in the face of prejudice. Some hibakusha refused to permit U.S. scien-
tists to use their personal pain as “data” for political or scientific purposes
unrelated to treatment of their wounds. Kurihara Sadako expressed this
attitude in vivid language when she compared the scientists of the U.S.
Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission to “vultures, [who] carried off the
corpses.”\textsuperscript{57} For survivors like herself, silence was rebuke.

The same issues of power have resulted in important differences in the
treatment of hibakusha to this day. Among the most wretched victims at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were tens of thousands of Koreans, many of whom
were refused emergency medical treatment or were told to wait until all
Japanese were treated first. Those who returned to the Korean Peninsula
received no expert medical care, subsidy, or understanding. Lisa Yoneyama
shows the ways in which Korean and Korean-Japanese hibakusha,
marginalized by the Hiroshima authorities who placed their memorial out-
side the Peace Park, protested Japanese racism while insisting on maintain-
ing the integrity of a separate memorial.

Similarly, Sodei Rinjiro describes the difficulties that confronted Japan-
esia-Americans—including those who enlisted in the U.S. military, those
interned in desert camps, and those who ended up in Hiroshima during the war
and became hibakusha—seeking to negotiate between the country of their birth
and citizenship and that of their parents. As Sodei explains, American Nisei
hibakusha likewise were denied federal assistance for medical aid for decades. Indeed, it was only when their case could be combined with that of other Americans who worked on atomic projects and were callously exposed to radiation by their own government that assistance was forthcoming.\(^{58}\)

Some silences are expressions of experiences that are simply beyond words. The inability of many survivors to testify verbally to the true horror of the experience, and of others to comprehend it, mirrors the experience of concentration camp survivors and even of American G.I.'s and Japanese soldiers who served in combat, especially in the last and most violent year of the Pacific War.\(^{59}\)

Other hibakusha have disappeared in every sense of the word. One legacy of the atomic bombings was the staggering number of people who died instantly or disappeared in August 1945. Their absence is a powerful silence, and the personal possessions they left behind—belt buckles, wooden shoes, watches—testify to their echoing absence. Eerily, the intense heat of the atomic bombs etched the shapes of people on stone and wood, leaving no other trace. Yet each shadow leaves behind a story, such as the person who was sitting on the steps of the Sumitomo Bank in Hiroshima, waiting for it to open. Was it someone waiting to take money out to travel, perhaps to see a child who had been evacuated to the countryside? To care for parents whose house had been firebombed in Osaka? There are no clues. But their shadows remain eloquent testimony to those lost lives, precisely because they make us wonder about them as fellow human beings.

It was that moment of human empathy that was blocked when such artifacts and photos were barred from view at the Air and Space Museum in 1995. Nevertheless, the silent testimony of one hibakusha, Yasui Koichi, spoke volumes. He attended the opening day of the Smithsonian exhibit, which had been stripped of all visual reminders of the human targets of Little Boy. Standing in dignified silence in front of a life-sized exhibition photograph of the smiling crew of the *Enola Gay*, he reinserted his perspective and that of a generation of hibakusha into the exhibit.

It is in this context that we must look at the acts of censorship and commemoration that continue to shape our memories of the two bombs that fell in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If the next fifty years are anything like the last, neither Japanese nor American attempts to ignore or minimize the hibakusha experience are likely to be fully successful. Such efforts have not been able to lay to rest the ghosts that have continued to haunt Americans and Japanese.

The stories of individual hibakusha are too powerful and too complex to be denied. They command attention. Eventually, in photographs, films, autobiographies, documentary accounts, drawings and murals, sculpture, monuments, documentary fiction, children's stories, music, and scholarly
Shadow of human being sitting in front of Sumitomo Bank, Hiroshima. Many people disappeared altogether, leaving only the traces of a human form etched onto some sturdier material. The flash and heat of the bomb were so intense that the top layer of the granite steps of the Sumitomo Bank was scoured away, except in the area where someone was sitting, perhaps waiting for the bank to open. This image derives much of its power from its fusing of individuality and anonymity. One human life ended on this spot at 8:15 A.M. on August 6, 1945, but we will never know which, out of so many. (1948. Ienaga, 2.17.)

accounts, the hibakusha experiences made their way into public consciousness with powerfully disruptive effects in the United States and, in different ways, in Japan. The American wish to sustain an image of the bomb as the savior of American and even of Japanese lives faces its most formidable challenge in the pictorial and verbal images of the hibakusha.

These silences have been broken over and over again. Simple things, such as a pocket watch stopped at 8:15 or the story of one person, whose
This life-sized wall poster of the crew of the Enola Gay, mounted at the National Air and Space Museum’s atomic bomb exhibition, captures the official American presentation of the bombings. Frozen in time, the crew appears young, happy, and relaxed. On the opening day, hibakusha Yasui Koichi restored some of the elements that had been eliminated from the Enola Gay exhibition. By standing next to the poster, he reintroduced the hibakusha’s perspective on both the bombing of Hiroshima and the passage of fifty years since then. (Photographer Ed Hedemann, June 28, 1995. Used by permission.)

family—described and named—was destroyed in an instant, disrupt the official stories. In their humanity and their pain, they reach beyond narratives of necessity and high politics. Each story is so personal, even though the general outlines of mass death are chillingly familiar. Each is such a private hell within the general one: a story of a child who disappeared without a trace; another of a brother who seemed fine for a while, only to die later; another whose loved ones lingered in agony for months; others who wished they too had died. The stories—of pain, of tragedy but also of small kindnesses by strangers, and most of all, of the irrationality in one person’s survival when so many nearby did not survive—are both deeply personal and oddly uniform. These stories—in their evocation of pain, fear, and loss—bring the listener back, not to the moments when the bombs left the plane or even when they exploded above the doomed cities, but to the
long years since then, years spent in private mourning and ill health, stretching into five decades of living with the bomb.

Notes

1. On these themes, see *Enola Gay: The First Atomic Mission*, video produced in 1995 by Jonathan S. Felt as part of the final *Enola Gay* exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution.

2. For more than fifty years, atomic casualty figures have been no less contested than those of the Holocaust and the Nanjing massacre. The most comprehensive and reliable discussion of various casualty estimates remains that provided in the Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused in the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, *The Physical, Medical and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombs* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 335–92. The committee concluded that total deaths attributable to the bombings were in the range of 140,000 in Hiroshima and 70,000 in Nagasaki, the great majority of which occurred within months of the explosions. For a recent discussion of Japanese government fatality statistics, see John Dower, “Three Narratives of Our Humanity,” in *History Wars: The Enola Gay Controversy and Other Battles for the American Past*, Edward Linenthal and Thomas Engelhardt, eds. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996).


11. Many people have treated this battle over the commemoration of the bomb and the end of World War II in more detail than we do here. See Laura Hein, ed., “Remembering the Bomb: The Fiftieth Anniversary in the United States and Japan,” special issue, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 27, no. 2 (April–June 1995); Mike Wallace, “The Battle of the Enola Gay,” Radical Historians Newsletter 72 (May 1995), 1–32; and Edward Linenthal and Thomas Engelhardt, eds., History Wars: The Enola Gay Controversy and Other Battles for the American Past. See also the essays collected in Journal of American History 82, no. 3 (December 1995), special issue; and the ones in Diplomatic History 19, no. 2 (spring 1995), and revised and reprinted in Michael Hogan, ed., Hiroshima in History and Memory (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996).


18. Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 5


21. For suggestions that Truman was privately troubled by the morality of the use of the atomic bombs against civilians, see the chapters by Asada Sadao and John Dower in this volume.


24. Between six thousand and nine thousand government employees were fired under the loyalty programs of the Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower administrations, and at least eight thousand more were forced to resign. Griffin Fariello, Red Scare: Memories of the American Inquisition: An Oral History (New York: Norton, 1995), 42, 96, 131, 176, 508–9.

25. For the role of the Soviets, see Alvin D. Coox, “The Pacific War,” The Cam-
For a comprehensive discussion of casualty estimates, see Dower, *War without Mercy*, 294–300.


28. Although sharp debate has centered on the war responsibility of the emperor, the military, and the state apparatus, there has been little significant Japanese debate over the question of broad social responsibility of the people comparable to debate in Germany. Yuki Tanaka raises the sensitive issue of social responsibility for Japan in *Hidden Horrors.* See also the chapter by Ellen H. Hammond in this volume.


35. Interestingly, whereas Japanese debates quickly moved from the bomb to the nature of Japan’s wartime practices and on to the nature of Japanese colonialism, the American debate never engaged either the issue of U.S. colonial rule in the Philippines or the nature of the United States–China relationship.


40. Americans were also worrying about nuclear war in the 1950s, as manifested in civil defense programs in all major cities. President Dwight Eisenhower provided a vivid example of the way that nuclear preoccupations spilled over into the civilian realm when he launched the U.S. interstate highway program in 1956 in part to prepare national


42. Edward Linenthal, Sacred Ground: Americans and Their Battlefields (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 185–86. For Tibbets’s emotional entry in the debate over the 1995 exhibit, see the chapter by Michael S. Sherry in this volume.

43. Quoted in Sherry, In the Shadow of War, 468.

44. See Enola Gay: The First Atomic Mission, exhibit video, final comment.


46. In a sharp break with most earlier U.S. memorials, of which the Iwo Jima memorial is emblematic, Maya Lin’s Vietnam memorial focused exclusively on the personal sacrifice of those Americans who died in battle, listing each of their names and eschewing any heroic or patriotic statement about the war and American involvement in it.


53. Roeder, Censored War, 1, 14, 18–19.


59. For U.S. combat veterans, see Sherry, In the Shadow of War, 96–97. For one exploration of the tension between silence and expression of Holocaust testimony mediated through a son’s memory, see Art Spiegelman, Maus: A Survivor’s Tale (New York: Pantheon, 1973).
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